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Comment
Popov v. Hayashi, a Modern Day Pierson v. Post: A
Comment on What the Court Should Have Done with
the Seventy-third Home Run Baseball Hit by
Barry Bonds
Patrick Stoklas*
There is nothing which so generally strikes the
imagination, and engages the affections of mankind,
as the right of property; or that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over
the external things of the world, in total exclusion of
the right of any other individual in the universe.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Have you ever tried to unravel a baseball? An official Major League
baseball consists of two hand-stitched pieces of rawhide covering three
hundred and fifty yards of yarn wrapped around a rubber ball.2 Only
3
when one reaches the rubber ball will one reach the core of a baseball.

* J.D. expected May 2004. 1 would like to thank my family and friends for their support and
understanding while I worked on this Comment. I would also like to thank the editors and
members of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal and everyone else who helped with this
Comment. Your suggestions and insights were tremendously valuable.
1. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE LAW 118 (Gareth Jones ed., Univ.
Toronto Press 1973) (1765).
2. Gary Smith, The Ball (An American Story), SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 29, 2002,
at 63. A baseball starts as a small rubber ball sent from a factory in Alabama to a factory
in Costa Rica, where Rawlings produces all of its official major league baseballs. It Seems
Like They Need a Lot More Baseballs, TELEGRAPH ONLINE, May 24, 2000,
available at http://archive.nashuatelegraph.com/Daily-Sections/Sports/Archives/2000/may/
Once the rubber balls meet
stories/0524w-baseballs.htm (last visited May 7, 2003).
specifications, factory workers dip each one in a rubber-cement compressor. Id. Next, three
machines wrap each ball with yam. Id. An individual at the factory then places two rounded
leather pieces over the yam core and makes 108 stitches by hand to sew the two pieces together.
Id. The Rawlings factory produces approximately 36,000 balls a day. Id.
3. See It Seems Like They Need a Lot More Baseballs, supra note 2.
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In Popov v. Hayashi,4 a case concerning a dispute over the
possession of a baseball, even after examining the film evidence and
eyewitness reports, one still could not reach the core of the dispute and
determine which fan had possession of the seventy-third home run
baseball hit by Barry Bonds 5 of the San Francisco Giants. 6 The
controversy before the California trial court took little time to develop
but took significantly longer to unravel.7 The core of the dispute
revolved around possession of the baseball and the theory of acquisition
8
by capture developed in Pierson v. Post.
As Bonds chased history late in the 2001 Major League Baseball
season, he knew that he would affect baseball history 9 and the

4. Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002).
5. Barry Bonds plays leftfield for the San Francisco Giants, arriving in San Francisco after
beginning his career with the Pittsburgh Pirates. Marty Noble, Still Setting Records, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 12, 2002, § 3, at 3, available at 2002 WL 102893115. In 2001, he hit seventy-three home
runs, breaking the Major League single season home run record, and won his fourth Most
Valuable Player Award ("MVP Award"). Id. In 2002, he won his unprecedented fifth MVP
Award after hitting forty-seven home runs and winning his first batting title by batting .370. Id.
6. Smith, supra note 2, at 63. Gary Smith of Sports Illustrated describes the events that
occurred when Barry Bonds hit his record setting seventy-third home run. Id. at 64-68. He
discusses the difficulty of getting to the heart of the controversy through the stories of the
individuals involved (their lives, their pasts, and their heritages) as well as the actual events at Pac
Bell Park in San Francisco. Id. at 70-77.
7. See CBS Evening News (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 28, 2002). It took over a year for
the controversy to reach a trial court. Id. The trial lasted about three weeks and consisted of
fifteen days of testimony from over a dozen witnesses, including retired umpire Rich Garcia, a
teenage boy who claimed that the defendant bit his leg, and a panel of legal scholars that
discussed property law and the law of possession. Joe Garofoli, Trial over Bonds Ball Says It
All-About Us, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 18, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL 4035941. The parties
submitted a forty-two-inch thick stack of legal documents to the court. Id. The plaintiff also
submitted a four-and-a-half-minute-long video shot by cameraman Josh Keppel that showed the
"catch" and ensuing melee frame-by-frame, bringing to mind the famous Zapruder film that
captured John F. Kennedy's assassination. See Smith, supra note 2, at 76; Matt Bean, In Baseball
Trial, A New Use for the Replay, CourtTV.com (Nov. 18, 2002), at http://www.courttv.com/trials/
baseball/l02102_ctv.html (last visited May 7, 2003). From the time Dennis Springer threw his
pitch to the point when Patrick Hayashi held the ball in his hands took less than five minutes. See
Smith, supra note 2, at 76.
8. See infra notes 70-80 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and the holding of
Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)). The lawyers for the parties agreed that
Pierson v. Post provides the precedent in the case before the court. Smith, supra note 2, at 77;
see also Dean Murphy, How Finders Keepers Turned into a Joint-Custody Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 2002, § 4, at 7 (describing possession of an animal as going to the one who mortally
wounds the animal), available at LEXIS, News Library, New York Times File; Rone Tempest,
Baseball Lawsuit Goes on Road; The Fight over Barry Bonds' 73rd Home Run Ball Moves to
Law School for a Day of Arguments, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2002, at B24 (noting that Popov v.
Hayashi deals with property law first addressed in 1805 by Pierson v. Post), available at 2002
WL 2516266.
9. See Nat'l Baseball Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc., A Short History of the Single Season
Home Run Record, at http://www.baseballhalloffame.org/exhibits/online-exhibits/ss home-run/
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collectibles market. 10 Bonds, however, could not have realized the
potential impact he would have on the legal community and fan
behavior in ballparks." I On the last day of the 2001 season, with the
single season home run record already set, 12 fans flocked to Pac Bell
Park in San Francisco to see if Bonds would hit another home run,
giving them a chance to catch a potential two million dollar piece of
baseball history. 13 Alex Popov and Patrick Hayashi came to Pac Bell
with similar goals and left with potential claims4 to the possession of the
1
seventy-third home run baseball hit by Bonds.
The controversy between Popov and Hayashi arose after Popov
15
"caught" the record-setting seventy-third home run ball hit by Bonds.
Although the evidence never clearly shows that Popov gained control of
index.htm (last visited March 31, 2003). In 1927, Babe Ruth set the final of his single season
home run records, hitting sixty home runs. Id. That record stood until 1961, when Roger Mars
hit his sixty-first home run during the final game of the season. Id. Maris's record lasted until
1998, when Mark McGwire hit seventy home runs in a season. Id. McGwire became only the
seventh man to hold the single season home run record. Id.
10. See Smith, supra note 2, at 67. McGwire's seventieth home run garnered three million
dollars at auction, twenty-five times more than the next most expensive baseball in history (Babe
Ruth's first home run as a Yankee). Id. At the time, the purchaser of the ball, Todd McFarlane,
stated that his purchase would turn "people into lunatics," as if foreseeing the events surrounding
the Bonds seventy-third home run ball. Id.,
11. See Garofoli, supra note 7. Only one other time had a trial occurred over a baseball, but it
occurred on the television show The People's Court in 1998. See id. In that case, Mark
McGwire hit a baseball that appeared to be his sixty-sixth home run (it was later ruled a groundrule double because of fan interference). Id. One fan "caught" the ball, but a second fan held the
ball after a pile-up occurred. See id. The judge at the time, former New York Mayor Ed Koch,
awarded the ball to the second fan, who had complete control of the ball at the end of the melee.
See id.
12. See Smith, supra note 2, at 64. Bonds had already hit his record-setting seventy-first and
seventy-second home runs two days prior to the final game of the season. id. Further, Bonds had
possession of the seventy-second home run ball, as it landed back in play after clearing the fence.
Id. at 64, 66.
13. See id. at 64. A memorabilia-marketing agent, Michael Barnes, valued the ball at between
one and two million dollars before the trial began. Id. During the trial, however, those estimates
fell to the lower end of the spectrum. See Corey Lyons, Judge Expected to Rule in Trial Over
Bonds' Ball this Weekend, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Nov. 16, 2002, State and Regional News
(projecting the value of the ball at one million dollars), available at LEXIS, News Library, Contra
Costa Times File; Tempest, supra note 8 (stating that attorneys' fees will cost the parties one
million dollars, the estimated worth of the ball).
14. See Smith, supra note 2, at 64-68. Popov had traded a forty-dollar lower level box seat
ticket for a ten-dollar standing room only ticket before the game started and positioned himself in
right field beyond the 365-foot sign, where online research showed that Bonds had hit most of his
home runs. Id. at 64. Hayashi, comparing the ticket to a lottery ticket, purchased his standing
room only ticket on eBay (an online auction site) and also ended up in right field beyond the 365foot sign, standing only a few feet from Popov. Id.
15. See id. at 67. The video by Keppel not only shows the ball in Popov's glove for six-tenths
of a second but also shows that he had only a tenuous grasp on the ball. Joe Garofoli, Bonds' Ball
No. 73 TransfiguredLives, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 16, 2002, at A 15, availableat 2002 WL 4035785.
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the ball, it does show that he lost the ball at some point when the crowd
surged towards him in an attempt to get the baseball. 16 After Popov
dropped the ball, Hayashi emerged triumphantly from the crowd with
the ball. 17 Both men claimed to have a right to possess it. 18 Recently,
California Superior Court Judge Kevin McCarthy declared that both
Popov and Hayashi had a right to possess the ball and ordered them to
sell it and split the proceeds. 19 Although an appeal appeared imminent,
neither side appealed McCarthy's decision. 20 Currently, however, the
men have not abided by the decision either, as the ball remains unsold.2 1
Although he crafted an equitable decision, Judge McCarthy did not
clarify who had possession of the ball at the end of the melee-the one
who first touched it or the one who ended up with it. 22 Judge
16. Smith, supra note 2, at 67.
17. Id. at 67-68.
18. See infra Part III.A (detailing the facts of the case and showing why each man had a claim
to the ball).
19. Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731, at *8-9 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18,
2002). Judge McCarthy's decision calls to mind the biblical story of King Solomon ordering two
harlots to split an infant child in half. See I Kings 3:16-28 (King James). Judge McCarthy stated
that an individual gains a pre-possessory interest in property if that individual "undertakes
significant but incomplete steps to achieve possession of a piece of ... property and the [failure to
continue the] effort is interrupted by the unlawful acts of others." Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at
*6. For this reason, McCarthy awarded Popov partial possession of the ball. Id. at *7. He said,
however, that awarding the ball to Popov would be unfair to Hayashi, the ultimate possessor of
the ball. Id.
20. See Editorial, Splitting the Baby, 170 N.J. L.J. 1022 (2002) (noting Popov has already
complained about the decision, stating that it "just shows that mob rule and violence can
prevail"); see also Tempest, supra note 8 (stating that attorney's fees will cost the parties one
million dollars, the estimated worth of the ball).
21. See Gary Smith, And the Ball Plays On, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 20, 2003, at 18.
"Popov, feeling that ballpark violence is being half-sanctioned by the ruling, has proposed that
Hayashi name a reasonable sum and allow him to purchase Hayashi's half-share--or possibly
face a Popov appeal of the verdict that could continue the litigation for another year." Id. Popov,
however, will not submit the ball to arbitrators because he feels Hayashi's arbitrators will provide
an unreasonably high price. Id.
22. See infra Part IV.C (discussing why the decision does not create certainty and does not
reduce the number of conflicts). Major League Baseball spokesman Patrick Courtney queried
"how many balls are there that are this historically significant," insinuating that this situation is
not likely to occur again. Maura Dolan, Fightfor Bonds' Home Run Ball Spills into Court, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 29832163. This question, however, fails to
address how many baseballs will become significant and how often this type of situation will
occur in the future. When Barry Bonds hit his 600th career home run on August 9, 2002, in San
Francisco, as a fan, Jay Arsenault, emerged from a pile holding the ball with his face bloodied
and his shirt torn. See Joe Roderick, Barry Bonds Blasts into History, CONTRA COSTA TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2002, at Sports, available at LEXIS, News Library, Contra Costa Times Files; Major
League Baseball: Pittsburgh Piratesat San Francisco Giants (ESPN television broadcast, Aug.
9, 2002). This ball also was the center of litigation after Arsenault and his friends "agreed before
the game to share ownership if any of them caught the ball." Bonds HR Ball Sparks Squabble,
TULSA WORLD, Aug. 22, 2002, at B4, available at 2002 WL 7131089. The friends said
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McCarthy's decision does not meet either of the concerns expressed in
Pierson v. Post; it does not establish certainty, nor does it reduce
conflict.23 Because the Popov decision failed to reach the core of
possession, it left the legal community
unwrapping only the first layer
24
of yam that covers this controversy.
This Comment examines to whom the court should have awarded the
ball by first looking to the history of acquisition by capture, discussing
the theories of philosophers,2 5 and examining case law pertaining to
wild animals 26 and fugitive resources. 27 Next, it discusses the facts of
Popov v. Hayashi2 8 and Judge McCarthy's decision. 29 This Comment
then examines both Popov's 30 and Hayashi's claims 3 1 to the ball, as
well as the consequences of the recent court decision. 32 Finally, this
Comment discusses why the court should have awarded the ball to
Hayashi 33 and provides Major
League Baseball with a solution to
34
promote safety in its stadiums.

Arsenault breached his contract. See id. Currently, Ken Griffey, Jr., has 469 home runs and Alex
Rodriguez has an opportunity to break Hank Aaron's all-time record. See The Milestone Tracker,
available at http://www.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/stats/mlb-milestones.jsp (last updated May
8, 2003). How will the fans at the stadiums react if and when these events occur?
23. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (requiring the mortal
wounding of an animal "for the sake of certainty, and preserving peace and order in society").
24. See infra Part IV.C (discussing why the decision does not create certainty and does not
reduce the number of potential conflicts between fans).
25. See infra Part II.A (discussing the property rights theories of John Locke and Sir William
Blackstone).
26. See infra Part II.B (discussing classic cases concerning wild animals and who has the right
to possess them).
27. See infra Part II.C (discussing the similarities between wild animals and fugitive resources
and cases that applied the rule of capture to those resources).
28. See infra Part III.A (providing the facts of the Popov case).
29. See infra Part III.B (presenting the findings and holding of Judge McCarthy's decision).
30. See infra Part IV.A (discussing Popov's arguments that he would have maintained
possession but for the violence of the crowd and why awarding him the ball would produce safer
ballparks).
31. See infra Part IV.B (discussing Hayashi's arguments that he clearly had possession of the
ball and awarding him the ball would create certainty and eliminate the possibility of fraud).
32. See infra Part IV.C (discussing why the decision does not create certainty and does not
reduce the number of potential conflicts between fans).
33. See infra Part V.A (discussing why awarding the ball to Hayashi would satisfy one of the
goals of Pierson v. Post, while awarding the ball to Popov would satisfy neither of the goals).
34. See infra Part V.B (providing Major League Baseball with a solution that not only
maintains a fan-friendly environment but also is a workable alternative to allowing fans to keep
balls hit or thrown out of play).

906
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BACKGROUND: THE RULE OF ACQUISITION BY CAPTURE

The rule of acquisition by capture still plays a role in the courts
today, and an analogy can be made between wild animals or fugitive
resources and the seventy-third home run ball hit by Bonds. 35 The rule
of acquisition by capture provides the conditions under which an
individual has a right to possess certain resources. 36 To protect these
rights, individuals have entered into lawful society, which protects
themselves and their property from the actions of others and relies on
the courts to settle disputes. 37 In Popov v. Hayashi, both Popov and
Hayashi sought to secure their rights as against all others to seventythird home run ball hit by Bonds. 38 This Comment will argue that to
reach a proper decision regarding ownership of the ball, one should
examine the theories of classical political and legal theorists 39 and the
case law regarding the capture of wild animals 40 and fugitive
resources.41 After examining this history, one can determine what
constitutes a property right in a baseball and conclude whether Popov or
42
Hayashi gained a property right in it.
A. Locke and Blackstone: Views on Property
In Pierson v. Post, the first American case in which a court examined
the rule of acquisition by capture in regard to wild animals, the court

35. See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 75
(1985). Rose indicates that "inquiries into the acquisition of title to wild animals... may seem
purely academic .... [Alnalogies to the capture of wild animals show up time and again when
courts have to deal on a nonstatutory basis with some 'fugitive' resource that is being reduced to
property for the first time," such as oil, gas, groundwater, or space on the spectrum of radio
frequencies. Id.
36. See infra Part II.B (discussing what the court requires of an individual to create a property
right in wild animals); infra Part II.C (discussing what the court requires of an individual to create
a property ight in fugitive resources).
37. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 14 (Thomas P. Peardon ed.,
Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690). John Locke noted that "[t]o avoid [a] state of war-wherein
there is no appeal but to heaven, and ... where there is no authority to decide between the
contenders-is one great reason of men's putting themselves into society and quitting the state of
nature." Id.
38. See Smith, supra note 2, at 63-64.
39. See infra Part II.A (discussing the property rights theories of John Locke and Sir William
Blackstone).
40. See infra Part II.B (discussing classic cases that determine who has the right to possess
wild animals).
41. See infra Part II.C (discussing the similarities between wild animals and fugitive resources
and applying the rule of capture to these resources).
42. See infra Part V.A (concluding that the court should award the ball to Hayashi because it
will satisfy one of the goals of Pierson v. Post, while awarding the ball to Popov will satisfy
neither of the goals).
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43
looked to the works of Justinian, Fleta, Pufendorf, and Barbeyrac.
The court also considered the works of two other prominent thinkers:
John Locke44 and Sir William Blackstone. 4 5 These theorists provide a
strong and thoughtful
start in determining how and when a property
46
right develops.
According to Locke, God gave the Earth to mankind in common,
making it difficult to determine how any individual can gain a private
property right in any object.47 Each man or woman, however, has a
property right exclusive to him or her in his or her body; no one can
take away the fruits of an individual's labor. 48 By mixing one's labor
with property available to mankind in general, individuals appropriate
that property for themselves exclusive of the rest of society. 49 In

43. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cal. R. 175, 177-79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). According to the court in
Pierson v. Post, Justinian and Fleta stated that pursuit alone could not create a property right for
an individual. Id. at 177. Even wounding an animal and remaining in pursuit does not create a
property right. Id. They required that an individual actually take the animal. See id. According
to the court, Pufendorf declared that a mortally wounded wild animal belonged to the individual
who caused the wound if the individual remained in pursuit of the animal. Id. According to the
dissent, Barbeyrac allowed a fight to possess an animal when pursuit began, if pursuit included
"large dogs and hounds." See id. at 181-82 (Livingston, J., dissenting). "Justinian's Institutes is
a Roman law treatise of the sixth century; ... Fleta refers to a Latin textbook on English law
written in 1290 or thereabouts, supposedly in Fleet prison and possibly by one of the corrupt
judges Edward I put there." JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 23 (4th ed.
1998). Barbeyrac and Pufendorf wrote about legal theory in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Id.
44. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text (discussing Locke's views concerning
property rights).
45. See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text (discussing Blackstone's views concerning
property rights).
46. Although the other philosophers discussed in Pierson provide insight into property rights,
Locke and Blackstone have best survived the test of time. Locke's philosophy spread throughout
Europe and eventually reached America, where its influence is seen in the Declaration of
Independence and state constitutions. Thomas P. Peardon, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, THE
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, at xix-xx (Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690). Blackstone's
works influenced politicians and, like the works of Locke, students have studied his texts. See
Gareth Jones, Preface to BLACKSTONE, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE LAW, at vii (Gareth Jones ed.,
Univ. Toronto Press 1973) (1765). His works proved popular in England, France, Russia,
Germany, and the United States amongst law students and lawyers, as well as the general
population. See id. at x.
47. See LOCKE, supra note 37, at 16. Giving the earth to humankind in general allows an
individual to use property for his or her support and comfort. Id. at 17. No one individual,
however, has a private right to property exclusive to the rest of mankind. Id. Only when an
individual appropriates property in common for his or her own good or benefit would that
individual gain that property interest exclusive of the rest of humankind, assuming that the
individual's appropriation of the property is prior to any other individual's appropriation of the
same property. Id.
48. Id. at 17.
49. Id. "[L]abor put a distinction between them and common; that added something to them
more than nature, the common mother of all, had done; and so they became his private right." Id.
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considering the taking of wild animals from nature, Locke said that an
individual who kills an animal expends his or her labor upon it, gaining
a property right in that animal above all others. 50 As people attempted
to take away the property of others, people entered into society as a
means to protect themselves and their property. 5 1 For Locke, the
individual who could first take actual possession over an animal, by
either capture or mortal wound, gained the strongest right to the animal
and entered society to protect these gains and other acquisitions of
52
property.
Similar to Locke, Blackstone began his discussion of property rights
53
by stating that God gave mankind the right to everything on the Earth.
According to the laws of nature and reason, the individual who first
used property gained a right to it that lasted only as long as that
individual used the property. 54 Blackstone, however, believed that as
the population increased, people needed a concept for more permanent
property rights. 55 Without this concept of property rights, Blackstone
foresaw disputes arising over who gained possession of and had a right

The court applied this in Haslem v. Lockwood, 37 Conn. 500, 506 (1871). In Haslem, the
plaintiff gathered manure from public streets and placed it in a large pile. Haslem, 37 Conn. at
506. He planned to carry away the manure the following day and left it in the street. Id. Before
he could remove the pile of manure created through his labor, however, the defendant
appropriated the manure for himself. Id. The court found that the plaintiffs labor in creating the
pile gave him an exclusive right to the manure. Id.
50. See LOCKE, supra note 37, at 18. Locke later stated that a man who has killed, caught, or
tamed a wild beast has employed his labor and thereby acquired a property right in that beast. See
id. at 22. This theory appears to require inflicting a mortal wound or taking away an animal's
liberty pursuant to American case law. See infra Part ll.B (discussing classic cases regarding
who rightfully possesses wild animals). Locke presents similar views concerning fugitive
resources stating, "[T]he ore I have digged in any place where I have a right to the common with
others, becomes my property without the assignation or consent of anybody." See LOCKE, supra
note 37, at 18.
51. See LOCKE, supra note 37, at 14. Locke believed that people would enter into a state of
war because they only had the rule of force and violence, similar to the way that wild animals act.
See id. at 11. By entering into societies, an authority existed to resolve disputes and to produce a
rule of law, not violence. See id. at 14.
52. See id. at 14-22.
53. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 119. Blackstone stated that God gave man "dominion over
all the earth, and over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing
that moveth upon the earth." Id. (quoting Genesis 1:28). From this premise, Blackstone
concluded that all things upon the Earth "are the general property of all mankind." Id.
54. Id. at 119-20.
55. See id. at 120. Richard Schlatter agreed, declaring that "[the institution of property was
an agreement among men legalizing what each had already grabbed, without any right to do so,
and granting, for the future, a formal right of ownership to the first grabber." RICHARD
SCHLATrER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 130-31 (1951).
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to property. 56 For Blackstone, people entered a civilized society and
crafted property rights and laws because they desired peace and
security. 57 Similar to Locke, Blackstone believed an individual could
have a property right above all others if that individual could take
possession before anyone else; Blackstone believed that societies
58
developed to protect that right.
Both Locke and Blackstone required an individual to take action to
acquire property, and this taking had to occur before all other people's
actions. 5 9 To protect their right to property, individuals developed
civilized societies and created property laws. 60 This development
attempted to reduce the number of disputes that arose between
individuals over the same property. 6 1 Therefore, although an individual
can gain property rights to a previously unclaimed object by being the
first to capture, possess, or gain control over that object, the laws of the
62
society must also grant an individual a right to the property.
B. The Rule of Capture in American Case Law
with Regard to Wild Animals
Early courts in the United States relied on theories of property rights
found in the works of Locke and Blackstone and used their theories to

56. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 120. Without these property rights "innumerable
tumults must have arisen, and the good order of the world been continually broken and
disturbed." Id. For a similar reason, the court in Pierson fashioned a right of possession to the
individual who struck the mortal wound to preserve peace in society. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R.
175, 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); see also infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (discussing the
majority opinion in Pierson).
57. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 130. In order to achieve peace and security, English
lawmakers established a legal owner, whether that is the state or an individual, to everything. Id.
58. See id. at 119-30.
59. See supra notes 49, 54 and accompanying text (describing the actions that Locke and
Blackstone required to achieve possession).
60. See supra notes 51, 57 and accompanying text (describing mankind's reason for entering
into society).
61. See supra notes 51, 56 and accompanying text (describing the views of Locke and
Blackstone that numerous conflicts occurred while in a state of nature). In a similar manner, the
court in Pierson attempted to craft a decision that would reduce the conflict in society. Pierson, 3
Cai. R. at 179.
62. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 129-30. At the time in England, the law gave the
sovereign of the state property rights over wild animals because of disputes that arose among
individuals. Id. In a similar manner, in the United States, "the state holds the title to wild
animals in trust for the people, who are the beneficial owners," and the people have a right to take
the animals subject to and in accordance with state laws and regulations. 4 AM. JUR. 2D Animals
§ 15 (1995); see also State ex rel. Visser v. State Fish & Game Comm'n, 437 P.2d 373 (Mont.
1968) (finding that the Game Commission acted within its authority when it confiscated two elk
shot and killed by a guide without a hunting license).
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63
develop the rule of acquisition by capture in regard to ferae naturae.
Black's Law Dictionary defines ferae naturae as animals that are "wild;
untamed; undomesticated." 6 4 Animals, originally belonging to all
people in common, become the absolute property of an individual only
when killed because at death the animal cannot return to the wild. 65 An
individual does not gain an absolute property right in a captured wild
animal because that animal may escape and return to the wild.66 A
person can, however, gain a qualified property right in an animal by
bringing the animal within his or her power or control.6 7 Mere pursuit
of an animal, however, does not instill a property right to that animal in
the pursuer. 68 Even when mortally wounded, if one abandons one's
pursuit of the wild animal, then one has abandoned his or her right to
69
possess that animal.

The courts first examined the theory of acquisition by capture, in
regard to wild animals, in. Pierson v. Post in 1805.70 In Pierson, Post
had pursued a fox with his hounds over public land, but, as he closed in
on his target, Pierson shot and killed the animal. 7 ' The dispute focused

63. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text (discussing the use of property theories by
the Piersoncourt in reaching its decision).
64. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 635 (7th ed. 1999).
"wild animals" will be used in place offerae naturae.

For the remainder of this Comment,

65. See Earl C. Arnold, The Law of Possession Governing the Acquisition ofAnimals Ferae
Naturae, 55 AM. L. REV. 393, 394 (1921).
66. Id. at 394-95. While wild animals may escape and return to nature, domesticated animals
remain the property of the individual who owns the animal. See Manning v. Mitcherson, 69 Ga.
447, 450-51 (1882) (holding that an escaped canary bird belongs to the original owner); Herries
v. Bell, 107 N.E. 944, 945 (Mass. 1915) (finding that a dog that escaped from its owner belonged
to the owner and not the finder); Helsel v. Fletcher, 225 P. 514, 515 (Okla. 1914) (holding that
domestic cats do not qualify as wild animals); Oakley v. State, 214 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1948) (finding that cattle wandering from their owner's farm remain the property of the
owner). Even some animals not normally domesticated may receive this treatment. See Ulery v.
Jones, 81 111. 403, 404-06 (1876) (finding that a domesticated buffalo bull that escaped and was
subsequently shot constituted property of its original owner). But see Mullet v. Bradley, 53
N.Y.S. 781 (App. Term. 1898) (finding that a sea lion that escaped from captivity belonged to the
finder and not the original owner because after it escaped, it lived in the wild and did not show
any signs of returning to the original owner).
67. Arnold, supra note 65, at 395.
68. See Dapson v. Daly, 153 N.E. 454, 454 (Mass. 1926) (awarding a deer to the hunter who
killed it, not to the pursuing hunter).
69. See id. at 455.
70. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 177 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
71. See id. at 175. The non-ownership of the land played an important role in Pierson v. Post.
Had the incident occurred on an individual's property, it would have belonged to the person who
owned the property under the theory of "ratione soli." DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 43, at
33-34. This Comment will discuss this fact later in determining the ownership of the ball
between Popov and Hayashi. See infra Part IV.B (providing Major League Baseball with a
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on whether a property right developed in the fox during the pursuit or
when it was killed.7 2 In reaching a decision in favor of Pierson, the
court determined what acts were required to take possession of a wild
animal.7 3 The court stated that possession required that an individual
strike the mortal wound and continue to pursue the mortally wounded
animal, showing the intention to use the animal for himself and deprive
it of its liberty. 74 The court determined that giving the fox to Pierson,
who delivered the mortal wound, would produce a certain owner and
75
reduce the amount of litigation.
Although the majority decided in favor of Pierson for certainty of
ownership and safety, the dissent argued in favor of Post for two
reasons. 7 6 First, according to the custom of hunters, the hunter who
pursues an animal gains a property right in that animal. 77 Second, an
individual in pursuit of a wild animal expends labor and energy in

solution that not only maintains a fan-friendly environment but also is a workable alternative to
allowing fans to keep balls hit or thrown out of play).
72. See Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 177.
73. Id.at 179.
74. Id.at 178. In Liesner v. Wanie, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reached a similar decision.
Liesner v. Wanie, 145 N.W. 374, 376 (Wis. 1914). The plaintiff in Liesner mortally wounded a
wolf and continued to track the wounded animal. See id. Prior to reaching the animal, however,
the defendant fired a fatal blow into the wolf and took possession of it as his own. See id. The
court found in favor of the plaintiff, declaring that he had brought the animal under his control
with his first shot and that his pursuit made clear he meant to possess the wolf. Id.
75. Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 179. As discussed by Blackstone and Locke, people entered into
society because they wanted to protect themselves and their property. See BLACKSTONE, supra
note 1, at 130; LOCKE, supra note 37, at 14. By establishing a rule that vests possession of an
animal in the one who delivers the mortal wound, the court made people aware of the limits of
their rights and consequently reduced the number of disputes between individuals. See Pierson, 3
Cai. R. at 179.
76. Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 180-82 (Livingston, J., dissenting). The dissent looked to the custom
of the huntsmen and believed that the labor expanded by a hunter in pursuit of a wild animal
creates a property right in that animal, extinguished only when the hunter abandons pursuit. See
id. (Livingston, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 182 (Livingston, J., dissenting). The court and society have accepted customs for
resolving disputes. See infra notes 86-106 and accompanying text (discussing how in cases
concerning whales, the court considered the custom of whalers in determining who had the right
to possess a whale carcass). During the gold rush, California courts gave deference to mining
camp customs for settling disputes. Rose, supra note 35, at 82. These mining camps best knew
how to interpret symbols concerning property claims. Id.; see also Arnold, supra note 65, at 393
(noting how custom played a role in settling disputes over mining and water claims). In Maine,
lobstermen have rules that they expect all lobstermen to follow and handle disputes themselves,
without the aid of the court. See James M. Acheson, The Lobster Gangs of Maine, in
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 141, 141-42 (Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 1995). For
example, the lobstermen may handle territorial disputes by breaking or opening the offending
parties lobster traps. Id. at 142-43.
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pursuit of the animal. 78 According to the dissent in Pierson, the court
should have granted possession of an animal to the pursuer who tracked
the animal with hounds, as Post did. 79 The dissent favored the custom
of the hunters, noting that the decision favoring Pierson would harm
hunters' desire to pursue 80and kill wild animals deemed to be social
nuisances, such as the fox.
Although the majority in Pierson refused to follow the custom of the
huntsmen, custom in the whaling industry had a different effect on the
courts. The customs of the whaling industry were extended beyond
whalers, as authors wrote about these customs in prose, and England
transformed the customs into formal rules. 8 ' The "English Rule"
regarding whaling granted possession of a whale to the whalers who
could attach a whale to their ship with any apparatus, even if the

78. See Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 181 (Livingston, J., dissenting). While Locke advanced a belief
that an individual must perform a significant act of labor, such as wounding or killing an animal,
to gain a property right in the animal, he also accepted the idea that a pursuit constitutes labor that
could create a property right. See LOCKE, supra note 37, at 19. Locke stated:
[T]he hare that anyone is hunting is thought his who pursues her during the chase; for,
being a beast that is still looked upon as common and no man's private possession,
whoever has employed so much labor about any of that kind as to find and pursue her
has thereby removed her from the state of nature wherein she was common, and has
begun a property.
Id.
79. Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 182 (Livingston, J., dissenting). Arguably, the dissent's decision
would result in more disputes. See Jeremy Paul, A Bedtime Story, 74 VA. L. REV. 915, 921-23
(1988) (noting that law professors will typically present the majority opinion in Pierson as
providing an easier rule to administer than the dissent's proposal).
80. Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 180-81 (Livingston, J., dissenting). Judge Livingston noted that the
fox caused tremendous harm to farmers and the court should have crafted a decision that would
encourage the hunting of these creatures. Id. at 180 (Livingston, J., dissenting). He questioned
who would keep hounds if any individual could intercept the hunt and take the animal as his or
her own. Id. at 180-81 (Livingston, J., dissenting). Carol Rose, however, notes that in most
cases the pursuer will capture the animal unless one assumes that interveners, like Pierson, inhabit
the forest in large numbers, waiting to intercept the pursuit. See Rose, supra note 35, at 77.
81. See HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK (Wordsworth Editions Ltd. 1993) (1851); see also
Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling
Industry, 5 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 83 (1989). Robert Ellickson describes the three basic whaling
customs that existed prior to 1800. See Ellickson, supra, at 89-94. The first, as written about by
Herman Melville in Moby Dick, concerned the fast-fish rule. Id. at 89-90; see also infra note 95
(explaining the fast-fish rule). The second custom stated that the whaler who first struck the
whale with a harpoon and remained in pursuit had the right to the whale. See Ellickson, supra, at
90-92. This is similar to the finding in Pierson and Liesner. See supra note 74 and
accompanying text (discussing Pierson and Liesner). The final custom stated that "the value of
the carcass.., be split between the first harpooner and the ultimate seizer." Ellickson, supra, at
92. This is similar to the court's reasoning in Popov v. Hayashi. See infra Part III.B (discussing
the decision in Popov).
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harpoon did not remain in the whale. 82 The courts in Ghen v. Rich 83
and Swift v. Gifford84 followed the whaling customs in reaching their
decisions and also followed the idea of the mortal wound as declared in
85
Pierson.
In Ghen, whalers sought to recover the value of a finback whale they
had struck with a "bomb-lance." 86 After the whalers had killed the
whale with this type of lance, they watched it sink to the bottom of the
sea. 87 After three days, the whale resurfaced and floated onto a beach
near where the crew had struck the mortal wound. 8 8 An individual
found the beached whale and sold it at an auction. 89 The whalers
received word of this sale and went to claim their kill; when the
90
individual refused to return the whale, the whalers brought suit.
In reaching its decision, the Ghen court held that when whalers have
done everything in their power to obtain or secure a killed whale, they

82. See Paul Finkelman, Fugitive Baseballs and Abandoned Proper.,: Who Owns the Home
Run Ball?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1609, 1630 (2002). Paul Finkelman was one of the expert
witnesses for Popov, and he argues that the court should have awarded the ball to Popov in order
to create a safer environment at baseball stadiums. Id. at 1632. The English Rule is similar to the
custom that Melville discussed in Mobv Dick. See MELVILLE, supra note 81, at 327-30
(describing the custom and distinctions between fast and loose fish). Finkelman uses this rule to
say that Popov caught a "fast-fish" when he caught the seventy-third home run ball hit by Bonds
and, because it qualifies as a "fast-fish," Popov owned the ball. Finkelman, supra, at 1630.
83. Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 159 (D. Mass. 1881); see also infra notes 86-94 and
accompanying text (discussing Ghen v. Rich, where the court allowed the individual who struck
the mortal wound, and not the finder, to gain a property right in the whale).
84. Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1872); see also infra notes 95-106 and
accompanying text (discussing the decision in Swift v. Gifford in which the court applied whaling
custom to determine which party gained a property ight in a fast-fish).
85. See Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 179 (requiring a mortal wound in order to promote certainty and
the preservation of order in society).
86. Ghen, 8 F. at 159. After death with this type of weaponry, a whale would sink to the
bottom of the sea and would rise to the surface after a few days. Id. According to the decision,
whalers would claim their whales based on the markings on the lances imbedded in the whales.
Id. at 160.
87. Id. at 160.
88. Id. The crew killed the whale on April 9, 1880, near Cape Cod. Id. It resurfaced and
floated onto a beach in Brewster, Massachusetts, on April 12, 1880, seventeen miles from where
the crew killed it. Id.
89. Id. According to the custom at that time, finders of whales killed in this manner would
notify the whalers of their find and receive a finder's fee. Id. This is similar to the third custom
discussed by Ellickson, whereby the finder of a whale and the first harpooner split the value of
the whale carcass. See Ellickson, supra note 81, at 92-94. Nevertheless, custom at this time
dictated that the individual who killed a whale had the fight to the carcass of the whale. See
Ghen, 8 F. at 160. The decision in Pierson would support this custom. See Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at
178-80 (awarding possession of the fox to the individual who struck the mortal wound).
90. See Ghen, 8 F. at 160.
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91
create a property right in the whale and should obtain possession of it.
When a whaler kills a whale, the whaler establishes complete and
absolute possession of the killed whale. 92 Fearing that the whaling
industry would fail if it awarded the whale to the finder 93 and finding
that the whaler struck the mortal wound and did
all he could to identify
94
the kill, the court awarded the whaler damages.

In an earlier whaling case, the court faced a question of property
rights in a whale characterized as a fast-fish.9 5 In Swift v. Gifford, a
whaler's harpoon struck and remained in a hunted whale, but the line
did not remain attached to the ship.9 6 The first whaler remained in
pursuit, but before he could catch the wounded whale, a second whaling
ship captured it. 9 7 Upon arriving at the second whaler's ship, the first

91. Id. at 160, 162. The requirement to do whatever a whaler could do within his or her power
seems to include distinctly marking his or her lances. See id. at 160.
92. Id. at 161. When a whaler strikes the mortal wound, his or her fight to the whale
"become[s] firm and complete, the right of property is clear, and has all the characteristics of
property." Id. (quoting Bartlett v. Budd, 2 F. Cas. 966, 966 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1868)). This
reasoning resembles the finding in Pierson. See Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 179 (awarding possession
of the fox to the individual who struck the mortal wound).
93. Ghen, 3 F. at 162. The dissent in Pierson had a similar fear that no one would hunt foxes
if the court awarded the fox to Pierson and that foxes would multiply and cause harm to farmers.
See Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 180-81 (Livingston, J., dissenting). In Ghen, the court feared that no
whaler would attempt to pursue whales if a chance finder could reap the benefits. Ghen, 3 F. at
162.
94. Ghen, 3 F. at 162. In a similar case, whalers killed a whale, wound a cable around it,
anchored it at sea, and returned to shore. See Bartlett, 2 F. Cas. at 966. The following morning, a
different crew found the whale wound in cable but detached from the anchor. Id. The court
awarded the whale to the crew that had stricken the mortal wound, finding that the crew had
established possession in the whale. Id. Again, that crew had done everything it could to secure
the whale and had shown its intent to possess it. Id.
95. See Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558, 559 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1872). Melville wrote that a
"fast-fish" belongs to the individual attached to it. See MELVILLE, supra note 81, at 327. He
explained:
Alive or dead a fish is technically fast, when it is connected with an occupied ship or
boat, by any medium at all controllable by the occupant or occupants,-a mast, an oar,
a nine-inch cable, a telegraph wire, or a strand of cobweb, it is all the same. Likewise a
fish is technically fast when it bears a waif, or any other recognized symbol of
possession; so long as the party waifing it plainly evince their ability at any time to
take it alongside, as well as their intention to do so.
Id. at 327-28.
96. See Swift, 23 F. Cas. at 560; see also Ghen, 3 F. at 161 (providing a more detailed factual
background of the Swift case than the opinion in Swift does).
97. See Swift, 23 F. Cas. at 560. Again, Ghen also provided a clear picture of the factual
events involved in Swift. See Ghen, 3 F. at 161. This fact pattern resembled that seen in Liesner
v. Wanie, 145 N.W. 374, 374 (Wis. 1914).
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whaler laid claim to the animal and took it away. 98 Citing custom that
granted the whale to the finder, the second whaler brought suit to regain
99
possession of the whale.
The Swift court began by examining the two contemporary, yet
conflicting, general customs that concerned whales struck with a
harpoon but unattached to any boat.10 0 The first custom, followed by
English and Scottish whalers, declared that whalers would classify a
whale as a fast-fish only if "the line remains fast to the boat."10 1 The
other custom, as followed in the Americas, declared that the harpoon
marked the whale and did not require attachment to a boat, meaning that
the harpooned whale belonged to the boat that struck it. 10 2 The court
wanted to uphold the reasonable customs of the whalers and reduce the
03
number of disputes that arose concerning whales struck by a harpoon.1
It did not want to arrive at a decision that would undermine society's
general understanding of the whalers' customs by creating an arbitrary
exception to the customs;' °4 its decision proved difficult when faced
with the two conflicting customs. 10 5 The court concluded that the crew
that first struck the whale, so that its harpoon remained in the carcass,
10 6
and continued its pursuit developed a property right in the whale.
98. See Swift, 23 F. Cas. at 559. When the first whaler arrived, the second whaler gave him
the killed whale. Id. According to the court, by doing so, the second group of whalers
acknowledged that it had no right to possess the dead whale. See id. at 560.
99. See id. at 559. The custom that the second group of whalers cited granted the finder of a
whale struck by a harpoon, yet unattached to a ship, a right to possess the whale. See id. Under
that custom, the finder had a right to the whale if the finder could begin cutting the blubber and
extracting the oil prior to a demand for the whale from the ship that caused the mortal wound.
See id.
100. See id.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 560. The court in Pierson wanted to craft a decision that would have a similar
result: to preserve peace and order in society. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 179 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1805).
104. Swift, 23 F.Cas. at 559-60. Concerning this point, the court noted that Justice Story had
declared: "'It has long appeared to me that there is no small danger in admitting such loose and
inconclusive usages and customs, often unknown to particular parties, and liable to great
misunderstandings and misinterpretations and abuses, to outweigh the well-known and wellsettled principles of law."' Id. at 559 (quoting The Reeside, 20 F. Cas. 458, 459 (C.C. Mass.
1837)). The court adopted a well-known use or custom so as to limit the number of disputes that
would arise. See id.
105. Id. at 560. The court acknowledged this difficulty when it declared that it was
unreasonable to allow a finder of a whale to acquire title when the crew that wounded the whale
had a reasonable hope to capture it. Id. Because a harpoon remained in a whale, however, did
not present conclusive evidence that another party had a right to the whale. Id.
106. Id. This decision fell in line with other cases concerning wild animals. See Liesner v.
Wanie, 145 N.W. 374, 376 (Wis. 1914) (finding that, even though a wolf survived an initial
wound, it would eventually die, and, because the pursuit continued, the individual who struck the
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The holdings of Pierson, Ghen, Swift, and their progeny provide
important insights and conclusions when looking at cases involving
wild animals. First, a court's decision concerning who has created a
property right in a wild animal can take into account custom as long as
the majority of society knows of the custom. 10 7 Second, when
considering ownership rights regarding wild animals, courts have
attempted to craft decisions that achieve certainty 10 8 and maintain a
peaceful society by preventing disputes. 1° 9 Because of its desire for
certainty and the prevention of disputes, the court required that a party
strike the mortal wound and, if the mortal wound did not kill the animal
immediately, that the party pursue the animal until it was captured. 110
Finally, the state has the power to regulate the capture of wild
animals.' I The law of capture for wild animals has not changed since
the Piersoncourt reached its decision in 1805.112
C. The Rule of Capture as Applied to Fugitive Resources
in American Case Law
The rule of capture pertaining to fugitive resources, such as oil and
natural gas, states that an individual who can extract oil or mineral
deposits from the land prior to or at the same time as another individual
has developed a property right in the deposits appropriated. 1 3 This rule
parallels the rule of capture for wild animals. 114 Early court decisions
mortal wound had staked a claim to the dying wolf); Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 179-80 (granting
possession to the individual who strikes the mortal wound).
107. See Swift, 23 F. Cas. at 559-60. In order to prevent disputes, the court can arrive at its
decision based on society's "general understanding" of custom as long as that custom is not an
"arbitrary exception." Id.
108. See Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 179.
109. See id.; Swift, 23 F. Cas. at 560.
110. See Liesner, 145 N.W. at 376. Liesner v. Wanie best illustrates the requirement that an
individual continue his or her pursuit of a wounded wild animal until it is captured. Id.
111. See 4 AM. JUR. 2D Animals § 14 (1995); see also Visser v. State Fish & Game Comm'n,
437 P.2d 373, 376 (Mont. 1968) (holding that members of a hunting party did not have the right
to possess the elk when a licensed guide shot and killed two elk for members of his hunting party
in violation of state regulations). "The ownership of wild animals is in the state, and these
animals are not subject to private ownership except so far as the State shall choose to make them
so." Visser, 437 P.2d at 376.
112. See Arnold, supra note 65, at 394 (stating that the right of ownership in the first
possessor is still good law today).
113. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 64, at 1332 ("[T]he owner of a mineral right
covering migratory... substances can extract and appropriate them by drilling or pumping,
subject to the prior or contemporaneous capture of the same minerals by another mineralrights ... elsewhere.").
114. Compare supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text (stating the rule of capture for wild
animals), with Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa. 1889).
In Westmoreland & CambriaNaturalGas Co. v. DeWitt, the court declared that because oil could
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found that oil and gas possess similar characteristics to wild animals
because they could migrate from one area to another."l 5 This Part will
examine early case law pertaining to oil and natural gas, 1 16 how
different jurisdictions handle property rights in resources
prior to
1 18
extraction, 117 and how courts handle reinjected resources.
In Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana,119 the United States Supreme Court
described the similarities and differences between wild animals and
fugitive resources, holding that a property right arises in fugitive
resources only after someone can reduce those resources to
possession. 120 The Court found three similarities between wild animals
and fugitive resources: (1) owners of the land have the exclusive right to
reduce wild animals and fugitive resources to possession when those

escape much like wild animals, one possessed the oil "so long as [it is] on or in [the land]."
DeWitt, 18 A. at 725. Once they escape the land, resources "belong" to another landowner or the
first individual that can bring them under his or her control. Id. The court called these fugitive
resources minerals ferae naturae. Id.
115. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 43, at 37 (stating that oil and gas may migrate
from A's land to B's land because of natural conditions or because B placed an oil well on the
land); Rance L. Craft, Of Reservoir Hogs and Pelt Fiction:Defending the Ferae Naturae Analogy
Between Petroleum and Wildlife, 44 EMORY L.J. 697, 703 (1995) (describing how oil will travel
through the earth's crust based on "the viscosity of the petroleum, the porosity of the rock, and
the pressures exerted by gas and water"). Scientific research has shown that oil and gas do not
have the same ability to escape by their own power as do wild animals. See A.W. Walker, Jr.,
Property Rights in Oil and Gas and Their Effect upon Police Regulation of Production, 16
TEX. L. REV. 370, 370-71 (1937-1938) (discussing how scientific research has eliminated the
analogy of wild animals to fugitive resources). But see Craft, supra, at 732-33 (concluding that
the analogy was appropriate). This early case law, however, still proves helpful because of the
court's belief that oil and gas could escape on their own and how the court applied this belief.
See Finkelman, supra note 82, at 1629-32 (discussing why the analogy of wild animals applies to
the baseball). This early handling of fugitive resources is helpful in examining the Popov because
a baseball has the power to escape from an individual's grasp, just like a wild animal can escape
from a hunter or, as the court believed, like oil seeping through the pores of the earth, escaping
from a landowner. See id.
116. See infra notes 120-42 and accompanying text (discussing the early case law by
examining Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900), Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399
(Ohio 1897), Barnardv. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801 (Pa. 1909), and DeWitt, 18 A.
at 724).
117. See infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text (discussing property rights in resources
prior to extraction under the theories of qualified ownership and non-ownership).
118. See infra notes 148-58 and accompanying text (discussing the early law regarding
reinjected resources and how that law has changed).
119. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900).
120. Id. at 208-11. The State of Indiana enacted a law that protected private property owners
from wasteful practices of common property, such as gas and oil beneath the surface. Id. at 19091. The State sought an injunction against an oil company that allowed gas drawn from a well to
escape. Id. at 192-93. The Supreme Court stated that landowners who held property with oil and
gas deposits beneath it had a right to appropriate the oil and gas but did not gain a property right
in it until they actually could reduce it to possession. See id. at 203.
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animals and resources are on their land; 12 1 (2) once the animals or
have no ability to follow; 122

resources have left their land, landowners
and (3) both require actual possession before a property right
develops. 12 3

The Court noted only one distinction between wild

animals and fugitive resources: wild animals belong to the public in
general, whereas fugitive resources belong only to those individuals
124
who possess the land above those resources.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Westmoreland & Cambria
Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt 125 made the first analogy between wild
126
animals and oil and gas, creating a rule of capture for these resources.
The court concluded that an individual's possession of the land did not
immediately vest the owner of the land with a possessory right to the oil
and natural gas below the ground. 12 7 In concluding that oil and natural
gas had similar characteristics to wild animals, the court applied the

121. Id. at 208-09. "[Tihe owner of land has the exclusive right on his property to reduce the
game there found to possession, just as the owner of the soil has the exclusive right to reduce to
possession the deposits of natural gas and oil found beneath the surface of his land." Id.; see also
William E. Colby, The Law of Oil and Gas, 31 CAL. L. REV. 357, 362-64 (1942-43) (providing a
general discussion of Justice White's majority opinion in the Ohio Oil case).
122. Ohio Oil, 177 U.S. at 209. "The owner of the soil cannot follow game when it passes
from his property: so. also, the owner may not follow the natural gas when it shifts from beneath
his own to the property of some one else within the gas field." Id.; see also Colby, supra note
121, at 362-64 (providing a general discussion of Justice White's majority opinion in the Ohio
Oil case).
123. Ohio Oil, 177 U.S. at 209. "[P]roprietorship does not take being until the particular
subjects of the right become property by being reduced to actual possession." Id.; see also Colby,
supra note 121, at 362-64 (providing a general discussion of Justice White's majority opinion in
the Ohio Oil case).
124. Ohio Oil, 177 U.S. at 209. In cases of wild animals, "ownership prior to capture and
possession is in the public and common." Colby, supra note 121, at 364. The public, as a whole,
has a right to own wild animals. Id. In cases of subsurface oil and gas deposits, however, "the
owners of surface lands overlying such deposits, as individuals, either own the actual oil and gas
which happens at the time to be vertically beneath the surface .... or ... own the exclusive right
to reduce such deposits to possession." Id. People who live above these subsurface deposits have
an exclusive right to tap and draw these resources; however, a property right develops only after
one has "captured" these resources. Id.
125. Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 18 A. 724 (Pa. 1889).
126. Id. at 725; see also Robert E. Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as
Applied to Oil and Gas, 13 TEX. L. REV. 391, 395-97 (1934-1935) (providing a detailed history
of early case law regarding the rule of capture as applied to oil and gas).
127. DeWitt, 18 A. at 725. The gas company, leasing the land, had already erected an oil
derrick on the land, allowing it to control the oil by opening a valve and allowing it to flow
through the pipes. Id. The landowner had no control over or possession of the oil at any time.
Id. The DeWitt decision overturned the findings of the lower court, which declared that
possession of the land grants possession of the gas. Id.
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analogy of the rule of capture to oil and natural gas' 28 and required that
the resources come under the control of a party for that party to gain
possession of the oil or natural gas. 129 This meant that if another party,
whether an adjoining or distant party, could tap into an existing pool of
oil or gas and gain control of it, the landowner lost title to the
resource.13 0 Although the DeWitt decision faced criticism, other courts
applied its finding in similar cases involving oil and natural gas. 131
The Supreme Court of Ohio applied this analogy in Kelley v. Ohio
Oil Co., 132 where the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from
drilling a well that would draw from the same pool of resources. 133 The
court would not grant the injunction, stating that it had no control over
the legal actions of property owners. 134 The court determined that an
individual landowner had no property right in oil beneath the surface of
the property that he owned; it required that the landowner actually gain
control of the oil to develop his property right. 135 In refusing to grant

128. Id. The court noted that oil and gas possess "the power and the tendency to escape
without the volition of the owner." Id. Because of this power, an uncertainty existed as to
whether the oil or gas would remain within a tract. Id.
129. Id. Locke arrived at a similar conclusion. See LOCKE, supra note 37, at 18 (concluding
that an individual gains possession of a mineral only after that individual has exerted his or her
labor and gained full control over the mineral).
130. DeWitt, 18 A. at 725. The court stated that "the one who controls th[e] gas, has it in his
grasp, so to speak, is the one who has possession in the legal as well as in the ordinary sense of
the word." Id. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied this principle four years later in
Hague v. Wheeler, 27 A. 714 (Pa. 1893). The plaintiffs and defendants all drew gas from the
same existing pool, and the plaintiffs wanted an injunction to close the defendants' well because
the defendants could not sell the gas. Hague, 27 A. at 718-19. The court denied the injunction,
allowing the defendants to drill for and possess as much of the gas as they could. See id. at 720.
131. See Hardwicke, supra note 126, at 391 (noting that critics blame the rule of capture for
waste in the oil industry); see also Craft, supra note 115, at 713-15 (noting that critics found the
analogy erroneous and that it led to overproduction, but concluding that the analogy generally
works).
132. Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399 (Ohio 1897).
133. Id. at 399-400. The plaintiff contended that he had a property right in the uncaptured
underground oil because of his property right to the land above the oil. Id. The oil company
wanted to build a derrick on its property that would likely drain resources from the pool, which
was located partially beneath the plaintiff's adjacent property. Id.
134. Id. at 401. Landowners have the right to use property in whatever manner they desire, as
long as they do not interfere with the legal rights of others. Id. For example, one generally
cannot angle a well beyond the boundaries of one's land "so as to trespass on the premises of
adjoining owners." Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate, 24 Cal. App. 2d 587, 603
(Dist. Ct. App. 1938). The court in Kelly saw the building of the well on the oil company's land
as similar to an improvement, and noted that owners of property do not have to submit to what
their neighbors view as a proper use of property. See Kelley, 49 N.E. at 401.
135. See id. The court said that because of the fugitive nature of the underground oil, "it is
property of, and belongs to, the person who reaches it by means of a well, and severs it from the
realty and converts it into personalty." Id. Oil residing under land forms part of that land tract;
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the injunction, the court allowed both parties to build as many wells as

they saw fit, allowing them to collect as much from the pool as they
desired. 136 The well owners gained a property right in whatever they
of whether the oil came
could draw from below the surface, regardless
137
from below their land or the land of another.
In Barnardv. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 138 the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania reached a similar conclusion, finding that an individual
could obtain relief by building another well to offset the production of
his competition. 139 Oil and gas that exist underneath the surface of an
individual's property "belong" to the individual who holds title to that
property. 14° Yet, this "ownership" lasts only as long as the oil remains
beneath the land or until another party can tap into the pool and draw

when it moves to an adjoining tract, it forms part of that land tract. Id. It, however, never
becomes the property of an individual until captured. Id.
136. See id. The court found that this amounted to a proper amount of protection for both
parties. See id. "Protection of lines of adjoining lands by the drilling of wells on both sides of
such lines, affords an ample and sufficient remedy for the supposed grievances complained of in
the petition and supplemental petition, without resort to either an injunction or an accounting."
Id. This allowance for wells to draw more from the resource pools than one's competition led to
criticism of the rule of capture. See Craft, supra note 115, at 713-15 (noting that critics found the
analogy erroneous and that it led to overproduction); Hardwicke, supra note 126, at 391 (noting
that critics blame the rule of capture for waste in the oil industry).
137. Kelley, 49 N.E. at 401. The court, echoing the finding of DeWitt, declared:
Whatever gets into the well belongs to the owner of the well, no matter where it came
from. In such cases the well and its contents belong to the owner or lessee of the land,
and no one can tell to a certainty from whence the oil, gas or water which enters the
well came, and no legal right as to the same can be established or enforced by an
adjoining landowner.
Id.

138. Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801 (Pa. 1907).
139. Id. at 802. The decision stated that every landowner possessed a right to drill on his own
land and erect as many wells as he saw fit. Id. It declared that the neighboring landowner could
protect his rights to the oil only by building his or her own wells. Id. Legislation has altered this
result, attempting to control the unnecessary production of wells. See Hardwicke, supra note 126,
at 398 n.9 (attempting to reduce the costs to oil producers, and therefore consumers, by restricting
the number of wells one can build). Although legislation has altered this decision, the important
part of the decision remains: The ownership of the oil belongs to the individual who can capture
the oil. See Colby, supra note 121, at 403 (presenting a detailed history of case law regarding oil
and gas in the United States, concluding that "oil and gas lawfully belongs [sic] to those who
have the ability and first capture them").
140. See Barnard, 65 A. at 802. The Pennsylvania courts described this "ownership" in the
subsurface oil as an "absolute ownership," meaning that while the oil resides beneath a
landowner's property, the landowner "owns" that oil. See Colby, supra note 121, at 379
(describing this as "qualified ownership" because someone can still draw from the common pool
of resources and eliminate a landowner's "absolute ownership"). If an adjoining neighbor can
"first tap and draw from the common reservoir," however, then the adjoining neighbor would
gain a property fight in the oil he or she has drawn and the original owner would lose his or her
"qualified" fight to the oil drawn out of the common reservoir. Id.
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the oil. 14 1 This remains the law: ownership in oil beneath the surface of
an individual's property does not become vested until that individual
14 2
can tap and draw the oil.
The idea that individual landowners hold no property right in fugitive
resources prior to capture has changed over time. 14 3 Now, jurisdictions
arrive at different conclusions as to a landowner's property rights in
fugitive resources prior to drilling. 144 Landowners may hold either a
qualified right to the fugitive resource beneath the soil 145 or have no
property right to it prior to capturing the resource. 146 Although both
doctrines grant an absolute property right in the fugitive resource only
after one has reduced it to possession, only the states that subscribe to
the qualified property right theory concede that a landowner has a
47
property right in the fugitive resources prior to drilling. 1
141. See Barnard,65 A. at 802.
142. See Colby, supra note 121, at 403.
143. See id. at 374-402 (discussing absolute ownership, or the theory of qualified ownership
in Pennsylvania, the non-ownership rule in Indiana, and the development of the non-ownership
rule in California case law); Hardwicke, supra note 126, at 400-04 (discussing the differing
views of qualified ownership and non-ownership).
144. See Colby, supra note 121, at 374-402; Hardwicke, supra note 126, at 400-04.
145. See Colby, supra note 121, at 373-79. This qualified right to ownership allows owners
of land with fugitive resource deposits an exclusive right to drill from the surface. Id. at 374. In
Hague v. Wheeler, the court declared that "the owner of the surface is an owner downward to the
centre, until the underlying strata have been severed from the surface by sale. What is found
within the boundaries of his tract belongs to him according to its nature." Hague v. Wheeler, 27
A. 714, 719 (Pa. 1893). Later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court modified this decision, stating
that these resources "belong" to the landowner "while they are part of his land, but when they
migrate to the lands of his neighbor or become under his control, they belong to the neighbor."
Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 44 A. 1074, 1075 (Pa. 1900) (adopting the decision and opinion of the
lower court). Therefore, a qualified right to possess the fugitive resource existed, but it would not
become absolute until an individual could collect it. Among the jurisdictions to accept this
doctrine are Arkansas, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. See Hardwicke, supra note 126, at 401-02
n. 14 (discussing the ownership rights of landowners).
146. See Colby, supra note 121, at 380-84. This doctrine resembles the qualified ownership
doctrine, in that individuals gain an absolute property right in the fugitive resource only after they
capture it. See id. at 380. Because of the nature of the resource, however, no property right
existed until an individual could capture the resource. See id. at 383-84. The owners of land
above fugitive resource deposits have an exclusive right on their own land to try to appropriate
these resources, but they have no property right in it until it actually is captured and controlled.
See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 208 (1900). States that have adopted this doctrine
include California, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, New York, and Oklahoma. See Colby,
supra note 121, at 384 n.97.
147. See Colby, supra note 121, at 380-84. This right depends on the migratory nature of the
resource and whether another individual landowner has the ability to tap into the resource. See
Jones, 44 A. at 1075. As long as the resource remains on an individual's property, he has an
"ownership" right to the resource. See id. This resembles the idea of ratione soli in cases of wild
animals, which "refers to the conventional view that an owner of land has... constructive
possession ... of wild animals on the owner's land; in other words, landowners are regarded as
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Courts have also developed an interesting way of handling fugitive
resources reinjected into the earth as a means of storage. 148 This
fugitive resource case law, however, still rests on the basic tenet that an
individual gains an absolute property right only after reducing that
resource to possession. 14 9 Early courts held that oil reinjected into the
ground extinguishes an individual's right to the oil, much like the
release of a captured wild animal extinguishes an individual's right to
the wild animal. 150 This concept acknowledged that fugitive resources
have the power to migrate to neighboring land and that individuals must
actually capture a resource to gain absolute possession. 15 1 Therefore,
when an individual reinjected oil into the ground, the individual had a
property right in the oil only while the oil remained on his or her
152
property and no one else extracted it.
The analogy between reinjected fugitive resources and wild animals,
however, received significant criticism. 153 Based on this criticism,
courts eventually overruled the earlier line of cases and held that
reinjected gas belongs to the individual or company that placed the gas
back underground. 154 Courts, however, now require that an individual

the prior possessors of any animals ferae naturae on their land, until the animals take off."
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 43, at 33-34.
148. See, e.g., Texas Am. Energy Corp. v. Citizens Fid. Bank & Trust Co., 736 S.W.2d 25
(Ky. 1987) (finding that the original owner of a reinjected resource does not lose title to the
resource when it is reinjected into the ground); Hammonds v. Cent. Ky. Natural Gas Co., 75
S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1934) (finding that a reinjected resource belonged to the first individual to
recapture the resource), overruled by Texas Am. Energy Corp., 736 S.W.2d at 25. Companies
would reinject these captured resources back into the ground for storage purposes. David C.
Green, Note, The Ownership of Natural Gas and Some Real Property Concepts, 36 VA. L. REV.
947, 947-48 (1950).
149. See Texas Am. Energy Corp., 736 S.W.2d at 28 (holding that an individual gains title to
oil or gas by capturing it); Hammonds, 75 S.W.2d at 205 (holding that oil and gas do not become
an individual's property until extracted).
150. See Hammonds, 75 S.W.2d at 206. The court in Hammonds employed the example of a
fish being placed in a private pond. Id. If the fish remains in the pond, then it belongs to the
owner of the pond. Id. If it escaped the pond, however, it would belong to the general public. Id.
151. See id. The court in Hammonds applied the analogy of the wild animal to fugitive
resources because fugitive resources could escape like a wild animal. See id.
152. Id. Once the Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. reinjected gas into the land, "the
company ceased to be the exclusive owner of the whole of the gas," meaning that any neighbor
that could tap into the reservoir could capture the gas for his or her own purposes. Id.
153. See Green, supra note 148, at 947 (discussing the problems with the analogy to wild
animals); John Parmerlee, Mines and Minerals-Leases-Rentals Accruing Under a
Subterranean Gas Storage Lease, 21 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 217, 222 (1952-1953) (concluding
that the analogy comparing reinjected fugitive resources to wild animals would produce illogical
results).
154. See Texas Am. Energy Corp., 736 S.W.2d at 28 (holding that an individual who draws oil
or gas from beneath the surface and then reinjects it into the earth retains possession of that oil or
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or a company place the reinjected gas into a well-defined and
inescapable underground storage reservoir. 155 This law also requires an
individual to reduce the oil or natural gas to his or her possession prior
to reinjecting it into these underground storage reservoirs. 156 Thus, title
to oil or natural gas reinjected into underground storage reservoirs
remains in the person who'first extracted it. 157 Based on this theory,
and
landowners above an underground storage reservoir cannot extract
58
possessor.1
original
the
with
remains
oil-title
the
gain title to
Besides the use of the analogy of wild animals to fugitive resource
law, the courts also used the theories of Locke and Blackstone to reach
their decisions. 159 Basing its reasoning on such concepts, the court
concluded that a landowner only gains an absolute property right to oil
or gas by extracting those resources from an underground reservoir
before any other individual. 160 A landowner does not gain an absolute
property right to gas or oil because he or she owns the land above the
reservoir.161 Depending upon where the landowner resides, however,
he or she may have a qualified ownership in that resource. 162 Early case
law that applied the analogy of wild animals to oil and gas received
criticism because of the scientific research done in this area; when
on its own
considering a fugitive object that has the power to escape
163
volition, however, the case law provides helpful insights.
III. DISCUSSION
Popov brought claims of conversion and trespass to chattel against
Hayashi, which forced the court to focus on who had gained possession

gas); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Murchison, 353 S.W.2d 870, 881 (Tex. 1962) (holding that the owner
of gas who reinjected it into a well-defined underground reservoir retained title to that gas).
155. See Texas Am. Energy Corp., 736 S.W.2d at 26. Such reservoirs must hold the gas so
that it cannot escape, thereby remaining in the individual's control. See id.
156. See id. at 27-28 (requiring that an individual first convert the gas to property by
extracting it from another source).
157. Id. at 28.
158. See id.
159. See supra notes 47-62 and accompanying text (discussing the theories of Locke and
Blackstone).
160. See Ohio Oil v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209 (1900) (concluding that objects become
property after one reduces them to possession); Colby, supra note 121, at 403 (concluding that
fugitive resources become property only after capture).
161. Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa. 1889).
162. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text (discussing the theory of qualified
ownership and the no-ownership rule).
163. See Craft, supra note 115, at 718-20 (presenting a discussion on why the courts
employed the analogy of wild animals to fugitive resources like oil and gas).
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of the Bonds home run ball. 164 In determining who had a right to
possess the ball, the court had to make a difficult decision in Popov v.
Hayashi, but its decision likely will have little effect on fan behavior at
ballparks. 16 5 Only one individual, Hayashi, clearly had possession of
the baseball. 166 Popov, however, could also claim to have a right to
possess the ball. 167 This Part will discuss the factual findings of the
court in Popov v. Hayashi.168 It will then examine the reasoning and
69
holding of Judge McCarthy.1
A.

The Facts

The court's examination of the video evidence of the "catch" and the
melee in right field, the testimony of more than a dozen eyewitnesses,
and the reports from various news agencies have produced a basic
factual history of the case, which is summarized below.
In the first inning, Bonds, facing a full count, launched Dennis
Springer's pitch into right field. 170 Popov heard the cheers and watched
as the ball fell back to earth directly towards him. 171 He reached up and
"caught" the ball. 172 His elation, however, turned into terror as the
164. Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731, at *3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18,
2002).
165. See Finkelman, supra note 82, at 1632 (discussing how a decision awarding the ball to
Popov could result in fans allowing another fan to catch the ball, "hoping that the person who
catches it is unable to hold it").
166. See Smith, supra note 2, at 67-68. Security guards, meant to prevent the chaos that
occurred, verified that Hayashi held the Bonds home run baseball. Id. at 68. Giants officials did
the same. Id. Major League Baseball representatives, while taking no stand as to whom has a
right to possess the ball, stated that Hayashi had the ball when they arrived to verify it. Dolan,
supra note 22.
167. See Finkelman, supra note 82, at 1628. Simply stated, but for the actions of the out-ofcontrol mob, Popov would have maintained control and possession of the ball. See id. This
argument has some merit. See Garofoli, supra note 15. The Keppel film shows the ball entering
Popov's glove and remaining there for six-tenths of a second. See id.
168. See infra Part I.A (detailing the facts of Popov v. Hayashi).
169. See infra Part III.B (discussing the findings and holding of the court in Popov v.
Hayashi).
170. Smith, supra note 2, at 66.
171. Id. Popov believed that the ball was meant for him and no one else. Id. Regardless,
because Bonds did not declare before his swing for whom the ball was meant, every fan in the
general vicinity of the ball's landing believed that the ball was "meant" for him or her. Id.
172. Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18,
2002). The word "caught" appears in quotes because Popov arguably did not catch the ball. See
infra Part IV.A (discussing Popov's arguments for having the court award the ball to him).
Keppel's video footage shows the ball in Popov's glove for six-tenths of a second. Garofoli,
supra note 15. Popov's "catch" may not be adequate to secure possession, however, because
former Major League umpire Rich Garcia defines a catch as requiring "that a player must secure
possession of the ball and firmly hold it long enough to prove that he has complete control of the
ball and that his release is voluntary and intentional." Dolan, supra note 22.
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crowd around him surged together and trampled him. 17 3 During the
melee, Popov lost the ball,174 and when he emerged from the crowd, he
have held
held a fake ball.17 5 He claimed that he had the ball and would
76
Hayashi.1
and
crowd
the
of
actions
the
for
but
ball
onto the
Hayashi watched the ball travel back toward the earth and entered the
melee to try to get it. 177 According to Popov, the film shows Hayashi
biting the leg of a teenage boy in an effort to get closer to the middle of
the scrum. 17 8 As members of the crowd intentionally clawed for the
ball or unintentionally fell into the pile, the ball rolled to Hayashi's feet;
he picked it up and placed it in his pocket for safekeeping. 179 After
realizing that he held the record ball, Hayashi attracted the attention of a
cameraman, raised the ball in the air, as is the custom in ballparks, and
showed he had possession of the ball. 180 Hayashi alleged that he held
the ball at the end of1 melee and, for this reason, has the strongest right
18
to possess the ball.
B. Judge McCarthy'sDecision
In Popov v. Hayashi, the California Superior Court focused on
Popov's claim of conversion, a claim that requires that the plaintiff have

173. Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *2. The right field walkway where Popov and Hayashi
stood transformed into a rugby pitch with Popov at the center of the scrum. Smith, supra note 2,
at 67. Cries for help are audible in the Keppel video. Id.
174. See Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *2.
175. Two eyewitnesses reported that Popov told them that he must have lost the ball after
attempting to transfer the ball from his glove into his clothing in an attempt to better protect the
ball. Smith, supra note 2, at 67. He emerged with a so-called "sucker ball," which Giants fans
lobbed into the scrum to add to the confusion. Garofoli, supra note 7. These "sucker" balls
received their name because fans wrote the word "sucker" across the ball in black ink. See id.
176. See infra Part IV.A (discussing Popov's arguments for having the court award him the
ball).
177. See Murphy, supra note 8. Popov alleged that Hayashi actually committed a battery
against him in attempting to get the ball. See id. Judge McCarthy, however, concluded that
Hayashi did not commit any wrongful acts in obtaining the ball. See id.
178. Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *2 n.5. The judge concluded that there was insufficient
evidence to establish that Hayashi committed any wrongful acts in gaining possession of the ball,
including the alleged biting incident. Id.
179. Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *2.
180. See id. Until one can show actual possession of the ball, the law of the jungle applies.
See Armond Budish, Crying Foul at Fans' Suit Over Record-Setting Ball, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER,
Nov. 3, 2002, at L5 (opining that anyone can go after a ball while uncontrolled, but once
controlled fans cannot attempt to take the ball away), available at 2002 WL 6382734. In most
instances, a fan holds a baseball in the air to show that he or she has complete control over the
ball hit into the stands.
181. See infra Part IV.B (discussing Hayashi's arguments for having the court award the ball
to him).
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actual possession of the property converted. 182 Therefore, the court had
to determine whether Popov attained possession of the Bonds baseball
before the alleged conversion occurred. 183 In determining whether
Popov gained possession of the ball, the court first looked to general
principles of possession.184 The court also examined the definitions of
possession provided by Hayashi and Popov. 185 Hayashi wanted the
court to require that one had to completely control a ball to gain
possession of it. 186 Conversely, Popov argued for a definition that only
requires one to intend to possess a ball and to manifest "that intent by
stopping the forward momentum of the ball whether or not complete
187
control is achieved."
The court determined that a fan should gain absolute control over a
baseball before gaining possession of that ball. 18 8 The court, however,
did not award the ball to Hayashi. 189 Instead, the court stated that the
facts could not establish that Popov would not have retained control of
the ball but for the actions of the others in the right field stands. 190 The
court declared that overlooking the fact that others intentionally
attempted to strip Popov of the ball would condone the use of brute
force. 19 1 Therefore, in order to find that Popov had developed a
property right in the ball, the court relied on the theory of a prepossessory right. 192 The court found that Hayashi had done everything
necessary to create a property right in the ball but could not gain an

182. Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *3. "The act constituting conversion must be
intentionally done." Id. The defendant, however, does not have to know the property belongs to
another for the conversion to occur. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at *4. Professor Roger Bernhardt from the Golden Gate University School of Law
stated that "'[p]ossession requires both physical control over the item and an intent to control it or
exclude others from it....
Possession is a blurred question of law and fact."' Id. (quoting Roger
Bernhardt). The court therefore had to "use these principles ...to craft a definition of possession
that applie[d] to the unique circumstances of this case." Id.
185. Id. at *4-5.
186. Id. at *4.
187. Id. at *5.
188. See id. The court stated that "[t]he custom and practice of the stands creates a reasonable
expectation that a person will achieve full control of a ball before claiming possession. There is
no reason for the legal rule to be inconsistent with this expectation." Id.
189. See id.
190. Id. at *5-.
191. Id. at *6.
192. Id. A pre-possessory interest arises when "an actor undertakes significant but incomplete
steps to achieve possession of a piece of abandoned personal property and the effort is interrupted
by the unlawful acts of others." Id. Judge McCarthy, however, cited no precedent for the rule,
stating instead that "[a] court sitting in equity has the authority to fashion rules and remedies
designed to achieve fundamental fairness." Id.
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absolute right in the ball because of Popov's pre-possessory right. 19 3
Because both men had a right to the ball, but neither had a superior right
to possess it, the court found that each man had a right to an equal and
undivided share of the ball and ordered them to sell it and split the
94
proceeds.1
IV.

ANALYSIS

Through the writings of philosophers, 19 5 case law concerning wild
animals, 19 6 and early case law regarding fugitive resources, 197 the court
should have drawn the following conclusions: first, an individual must
take some action, comparable to striking a mortal wound' 98 or
extracting oil from the ground, 199 to reduce an object to his or her
193. Id. at *7. Hayashi argued that baseball fans understand that "when someone drops the
ball, whoever winds up with it owns it." Paul Sullivan, Bonds' Record Ball Courts Legal
Wrangling, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 24, 2002, at N3, available at 2002 WL 101654713. Professor Brian
Gray of the Hastings College of Law developed the following definition for the court:
A person who catches a baseball that enters the stand is its owner. A ball is caught if
the person has achieved complete control of the ball at the point in time that the
momentum of the ball and the momentum of the fan while attempting to catch the ball
ceases. A baseball, which is dislodged by incidental contact with an inanimate object
or another person, before momentum has ceased, is not possessed. Incidental contact
with another person is contact that is not intended by the other person. The first person
to pick up a loose ball and secure it becomes its possessor.
Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *4. Hayashi satisfied the requirements of this definition. See id at
*7.
194. Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *8. In a 1983 article, Professor R.H. Helmholz advances
this idea of equitable division. R.H. Helmholz, Equitable Division and the Law of Finders, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 313 (1983). Helmholz examines the particular difficulties that occur when
deciding who has gained possession of an object between the finder and the owner of the property
on which the object was found. Id. at 313. He proposes that the finder and the owner of property
each gain an equal share in the object. Id. at 314. This theory of equitable division would protect
the interests of the true owner, promote honesty among the parties, and would resolve the claims
between the finder and the property owner. Id. at 315. Helmholz, however, notes that "realities
of litigation ... discourage either party from making an argument for equitable division." Id.
Equitable division attempts to divide the object between the two opposing parties in a fair
manner, giving each an equal share because both have a right to the property. Id. at 326. In
Popov. the court applied the theory of equitable division as advanced in Keron v. Cashman, 33 A.
1055 (N.J. 1896). Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *8. In Keron, five boys came across a sock
with unknown contents and each held the sock. Keron, 33 A. at 1056. The sock broke open,
revealing $775, and the court granted each boy an equal share of the money because none of the
boys could show a superior interest in the sock based on his intent and control. Id.
195. See supra Part II.A (discussing the theories of Locke and Blackstone concerning property
rights).
196. See supra Part II.B (discussing classic cases concerning wild animals and who has the
right to possess them).
197. See supra Part II.C (discussing the similarities between wild animals and fugitive
resources and applying the rule of capture to those resources).
198. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
199. See Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa. 1889).
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possession. 20 0 This action must occur before any other person can
perform a similar action in an effort to obtain the same object or
property. 20 1 By requiring an action of this nature, the court would leave
202
no question as to the ownership of a baseball hit into the stands.
Second, the court could have considered well-known customs 20in3
reaching its decision about who has possession of a fugitive object.
The court, however, should employ these customs in its decision only if
most of society knows of the custom, so as to limit or eliminate disputes
regarding possession of an object. 204 Finally, people have entered into
civilized society to protect themselves and their property, relying on an
arbitrator or judge to resolve disputes and offer protection. 20 5 Based on
these principles, the court in Popov v. Hayashi should have crafted a
decision requiring a specific act to obtain a property right in a fugitive
20 6
baseball in order to create certainty and security at ballparks.
Judge McCarthy's decision, while equitable in nature, does not
identify the actual possessor of a fugitive baseball, which satisfies
neither the goal of certainty nor the goal of safety. 20 7 This Part will
examine the probable results of awarding the ball to one of the parties
by discussing the arguments available to each side as to why each has a
greater property right in the ball and why these arguments fail. 208 Also,
it will discuss why Judge McCarthy's decision does not define who has
a right to possess a ball hit out of play and does not accomplish either of
the goals of Pierson.209 Upon reviewing these arguments, the court
210
should have awarded the ball to Hayashi.

200. LOCKE, supra note 37, at 17. Locke required that an individual labor in some way to
gain a property right in a particular object. Id.
201. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 119-20 (stating that the individual who first uses a land or
an object gains a right to it); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 64, at 1232
(defining the rule of capture for wild animals and fugitive resources and what each requires).
202. See Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 179.
203. See Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 159 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1881); Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558,
559 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1872).
204. See Swift, 23 F. Cas. at 559-60.
205. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 120; LOCKE, supra note 37, at 14.
206. See Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 179.
207. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the holding of Popov v. Hayashi and the problems with
the equitable solution).
208. See infra Part IV.A (discussing Popov's arguments for having the court award the ball to
him); infra Part IV.B (discussing Hayashi's arguments for having the court award the ball to
him).
209. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the holding of Popov v. Hayashi and the problems with
the equitable solution).
210. See infra Part V.A (discussing why the court should have awarded the ball to Hayashi).
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A. Popov's Argument for Safety

Popov claimed that, but for the violent collisions and the malicious
intent of the fans around him, he would have held onto the ball and
established absolute possession of it.2 11
Countering the expert

testimony of former Major League umpire Rich Garcia, 212 Popov
alleged that no one interferes with a player attempting to catch a fly
ball. 2 13 Applying the rules of baseball, 2 14 the umpires would have
awarded an out if an opposing player interfered with a player trying to
catch the ball; it would be as if he caught and possessed the ball. 2 15 In a
similar fashion, Popov could have alleged that the court should have
awarded him the Bonds ball because he would have caught it and
21 6
maintained control over it.
This reasoning contains several flaws, however, beginning with the
fact that several eyewitnesses questioned whether Popov "caught" the
Bonds ball. 2 17 Even if Popov held the actual Bonds ball, evidence only
established that he held it for six-tenths of a second,2 1 8 and a dispute
exists as to what actually happened in the ensuing pileup. 2 19 Popov's

211. See Finkelman, supra note 82, at 1628. The evidence showed the violent actions of the
crowd. See Smith, supra note 2, at 67. For example, eyewitness Doug Yarris stated that he
looked into Popov's glove during the pileup and saw the Bonds ball in the glove. Id. Video
evidence shows the ball entering Popov's glove and remaining there for six-tenths of a second.
Garofoli, supra note 15.
212. See Evelyn Nieves, A Custody Battlefor a Baseball's True Owner, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28,
2001, at A16, available at 2001 WL 30651380. Garcia stated that "if the rules of baseball
applied, as they should, then Mr. Popov never actually caught the ball." Id. Based on this
argument, Garcia contends that the ball belongs to the first person who can control it. See Dolan,
supra note 22.
213. See Finkelman, supra note 82, at 1628-29 (arguing that, in actuality, fielders receive an
unimpeded chance to catch the ball).
214. See Editorial, supra note 20, at 1022. Some commentators have indicated that following
the rules of the National Football League would have meant that Popov lost possession of the
ball. See id. "If he never had control of the ball in the first place, there was no reception. And if
he did have control of the ball, albeit momentarily, and then lost it, a fumbled ball belongs to the
one who recovers it." Id.
215. See Finkelman, supra note 82, at 1629.
216. See id.
217. See Smith, supra note 2, at 67. Jim Callahan, an individual who intentionally attempted
to take the ball from Popov, stated that he looked into Popov's glove and saw that he held a ball
with black felt-tip lettering, a "sucker" ball. Id. Fans at Pac Bell would throw ten to fifteen of
these "sucker" balls every time Bonds hit a home run in an effort to add to the confusion. See
Garofoli, supra note 7.
218. Garofoli, supra note 15.
219. See Finkelman, supra note 82, at 1628 (alleging that the crowd forced the ball from
Popov's glove). People, however, can question whether he lost control and dropped the ball
before anyone forced it from his glove. Id. Garcia, noting the tenuous hold Popov had on the
ball, believes that the crowd jarred the ball loose before a malicious action occurred. Id.
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claim that no one interferes with a player attempting to catch a fly ball
also fails because players from the same team will occasionally collide
with each other in an attempt to catch a fly ball. 220 Finally, and most
importantly, based on the rule of capture, Popov's dropping of the ball
does not meet the requirements for the capture of wild animals 22 1 or
fugitive resources. 2 22 In Popov, only catching or recovering a baseball
should have amounted to an act, like tapping into and drawing oil from
a well or striking the mortal wound, that would reduce the baseball to
22 3
possession.
Popov also could have argued that awarding him the ball would
support public policy, encouraging a safer venue. 224
As Paul
Finkelman, one of Popov's expert witnesses, stated, fans purchase
tickets to enjoy games, not to allow other fans to attack or jump on
them. 225 Awarding the ball to Popov would establish that a fan should
have an opportunity to enjoy the game and have an unimpeded chance
to catch a ball hit into the stands. 226 Popov, in an out-of-court
statement, claimed that awarding the ball to Hayashi would encourage
220. When this occurs and the player drops the ball, the umpire does not say that, but for the
collision, the player would have made the catch and then award an out. OFFICIAL BASEBALL
REGULATIONS R. 6.05. All runners are safe when this occurs and continue at their own risk
around the base paths until someone can get the ball into the infield and stop play. OFFICIAL
BASEBALL REGULATIONS R. 5.10.

221. See supra Part II.B (requiring the act of the mortal wound to reduce an animal to
possession).
222. See supra Part II.C (requiring the act of tapping into and drawing oil from a well to
reduce the oil to possession).
223. In arriving at a decision concerning the "mortal wounding" of a baseball, a court has to
determine whether stopping the momentum of a ball, that is, making a "snow cone" catch and
then losing that ball, constitutes possession. See Finkelman, supra note 82, at 1628-29
(supporting a view that Popov should possess the ball although he could not maintain control of
it). Alternatively, a court has to determine whether possession belongs to the person holding the
ball at the end of the melee. See Dolan, supra note 22. According to former Major League
umpire Rich Garcia, "if a home run ball is hit in a crowded stadium ...unless the ball is cleanly
caught, there is usually a scramble for the ball and collisions or other contact between spectators
rushing to get the ball." Id. According to Garcia, until someone has complete control of the ball,
it remains "fair game." Id.
224. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). As Popov's attorney
questioned, "What's it going to take: an eight-year-old child getting trampled to death?"
Tempest, supra note 8. Similarly, as Todd McFarlane, owner of the Mark McGwire record home
run ball, questioned, "How do you know some 250-pound guy won't do a belly flop for the ball
and permanently compress your child into the bleachers? Whoever catches it first should be the
guy who gets it. But we'll probably wait till an eight-year-old gets his ribcage crushed." Smith,
supra note 2, at 77.
225. See Finkelman, supra note 82, at 1628-29 (discussing why the court should award the
ball to Popov).
226. See id. at 1632 (proposing that awarding the ball to Popov would create an incentive for
other fans "to sit back and wait, hoping that the person who catches it is unable to hold it").
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the "law of the jungle," allowing larger and stronger fans to jar a ball
loose. 2 27 Because Locke and Blackstone believed people entered into
228
civilized society to protect themselves and their property rights,
Popov could have argued that civilized society would not allow a group
of people to force the ball from his hands. 229 Therefore, to minimize
the number of disputes between fans over baseballs hit into the stands
and to create safer environments at the ballparks, the court should have
2 30
awarded the ball to Popov.
Although this argument pertaining to the creation of a safer ballpark
satisfies the second goal of Pierson,23 1 it also presents problems that
may not create a safer ballpark in practice. Fans who assault an
individual, forcing that individual to give up a ball, should never gain
possession of a ball appropriated in this manner. 2 32 The court's
decision to award the ball to Popov, however, likely will have little
impact on "normal" fan behavior at ballparks. 2 33 Although fans do not
purchase tickets to allow people to assault them, fans do expect that
potentially violent jostling will occur while in pursuit of a ball. 2 34 This
jostling could result in a dropped ball, at which point the person who
picks up the ball gains the property right. 23 5 The claim that awarding
the ball to Popov would cause fans to allow one individual to catch a
227. See id. A fan who violently takes the ball away from the original catcher has acted
illegally. See Budish, supra note 180. "Anyone can go after the ball and 'secondhand'
ownership is allowed. Of course, you can't beat, bite or assault others to get the ball." Id.
228. See supra Part II.A (discussing the theories of Locke and Blackstone concerning property
rights).
229. See All Things Considered (Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast, Nov. 27, 2001), at 2001 WL
9437414 [hereinafter All Things Considered]. Finkelman states that the rules of civilized society
apply to the Popov case. Id. He argues:
[I]f someone puts his hand up and the ball is in that person's glove, we can't have a
society where it is OK for a mob of people to then jump on the person and force him to
give up the ball. If we do, then we have the rule of the mob rather than the rule of law.
Id.
230. See Finkelman, supra note 82, at 1632.
231. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (discussing the desire to
create a peaceful and safe environment).
232. See Budish, supra note 180. A fan who violently takes the ball away from the original
catcher has acted illegally. See id. Fans can acquire a baseball after another fan has dropped or
lost control of the ball, but they cannot violently take the ball from another fan Id.
233. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 2, at 67. Fans at a stadium likely will attempt everything
necessary to get a normal ball hit out of play, let alone a ball potentially worth one million
dollars. Id.
234. See Dolan, supra note 22. "[T]here is usually a scramble for the ball and collisions or
other contact between spectators rushing to get the ball." Id. Much like the court in Swift, the
court in Popov should have considered this custom in reaching its conclusion, as most fans realize
and accept it. See Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558, 560 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1872).
235. See Dolan, supra note 22.
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ball and wait for that individual to drop it is flawed. 2 36 Fans arrive at
the stadium, carrying their gloves, believing that they will catch any ball
hit in their general vicinity. 2 37 Every fan believes that a ball hit out of

the park was meant for him or her, meaning no fan will sit back to see if
another fan drops the ball.2 38 Collisions will still occur, some of them
violent, which may result in dropped fly balls. 2 39 Therefore, a decision
in favor of Popov would not guarantee safer ballparks.
B. Hayashi'sArgument for Certainty
The best argument that Hayashi could have made was that he clearly
possessed the ball at the end of the melee in right field,24 ° satisfying the
first goal of Pierson.24 1 In the Popov case, Hayashi reduced the ball to
his possession, which satisfies the requirements of taking an action to
reduce the ball to his possession as in the wild animal 24 2 and the early
fugitive resource case law. 243 Under fugitive resource case law,
whether governed by the qualified ownership or the non-ownership

236. But see Finkelman, supra note 82, at 1632 (opining that fans would give an individual
the opportunity to catch a ball hit out of play if the court awarded the ball to Popov).
237. See Smith, supra note 2, at 66. Just as Post brought his hounds to catch the fox, fans
bring their gloves to the game to catch a ball. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 175 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1805). Fans come to baseball games hoping to bring a souvenir foul ball or home run ball
back home with them. See Finkelman, supra note 82, at 1628. A batter, however, does not
indicate to whom he will hit the ball, so any number of fans may believe the ball belongs to them,
resulting in significant jostling for position and occasional violent collisions. See Smith, supra
note 2, at 66. Just as custom says fans can keep a ball hit out of play, it also dictates that people
will collide to attain that ball. Garofoli, supra note 15. Fans, however, do not purchase their
tickets "to be tackled, jumped on, mauled, or in any other way assaulted by other fans" while in
pursuit of a baseball. Finkelman, supra note 82, at 1628.
238. See Finkelman, supra note 82, at 1621-22.
239. See Budish, supra note 180 (stating that the law of the jungle applies at the ballparks);
see also Dolan, supra note 22 (discussing how fans react at a game when a player hits the ball
into the stands).
240. See Smith, supra note 2, at 67-68. Security guards, meant to prevent the chaos that
occurred, verified that Hayashi held the Bonds ball. Id. at 68. Giants officials did the same. Id.
Major League Baseball representatives, while taking no stand as to whom has a right to possess
the ball, stated that Hayashi had the ball when they arrived to verify it. Dolan, supra note 22.
241. Pierson,3 Cai. R. at 179. The court concluded that Pierson had a right to possess the fox
"for the sake of certainty." id. Unlike the certainty of striking the mortal wound in an animal,
problematic questions arise as to when an individual gains possession of a wild animal because of
their pursuit; when they first see the animal or after a certain length or duration of the chase. See
Paul, supra note 79, at 921-23 (discussing why the majority opinion in Pierson provides an easier
decision to administer).
242. See supra Part II.B (discussing classic cases concerning wild animals and what is
required to possess them).
243. See supra Part II.C (discussing the way that courts handle fugitive resources, concluding
that an absolute property right exists in a resource only when someone has reduced that resource
to possession).

2003]

Popov v. Hayashi, a Modem Day Pierson v. Post

933

doctrine, absolute ownership occurs only after an individual captures
the resource. 24 4 By considering the ball as a fugitive resource, every
245
individual in the right field arcade had a "right" to possess the ball.
Only that individual who stops the momentum of the ball and holds it,
however, gains a property right in the ball.2 46 Knocking a ball down or
bobbling a ball does not create certainty in ownership. 247 By awarding
the ball to Hayashi no question would exist as to what constitutes a prepossessory fight or whether an individual who proceeds to drop the ball,
after overzealous fans jostle him or her, has any property right to the
ball. 24 8 The fan who catches, controls, and holds on to the ball has a
24 9
property fight therein.

244. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text (discussing how qualified ownership
states find that fugitive resources "belong" to the individual who holds title to the tract of land
under which the resources rest, whereas non-ownership states find that the resources belong to the
people in common and grant no property rights in the property until the resource is reduced to
possession).
245. See Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18,
2002) (providing a definition of a catch leading to possession). Only Major League Baseball and
the National Hockey League allow their fans to keep balls or pucks that land in the stands. See
Finkelman, supra note 82, at 1621-24 (discussing the common law of baseball, specifically who
has an ownership right in balls that land out of play). The National Football League and the
National Basketball Association require that fans catching their balls out of play must return
them. Id. Accordingly, all fans who attend a baseball game have a right to retain possession of a
ball hit out of play; Major League Baseball does not reserve this right to a select few. As a side
note, the National Hockey League has reduced the number of pucks that reach the stands by
requiring all arenas to install protective netting behind the goals, after a fan in Columbus, Ohio,
died because a puck hit her. See Steve Rushin et al., Stories of the Year, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Dec. 30, 2002, at 15 (explaining the steps taken by the National Hockey League to protect fans
who attend games from airborne pucks after such a puck tragically killed thirteen-year-old
Brittanie Cecil).
246. See Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *4. This is similar to striking the mortal wound, as
seen in the wild animal cases, or drawing oil from a well, as in the fugitive resource cases. See id.
at *5.
247. Id. at *5.
248. See id. at *6. In his decision, Judge McCarthy determined that Popov had a "prepossessory" interest in the property. Id. A "pre-possessory" interest arises when "an actor
undertakes significant but incomplete steps to achieve possession of a piece of abandoned
personal property and the effort is interrupted by the unlawful acts of others." Id. This interest
raises several questions: When does this pre-possessory right begin? What constitutes a
significant step? Is it an unlawful act for a fan at a ballpark who wants to catch a ball hit out of
play to unintentionally knock over the fan seated next to him or her? How will one determine
whether a fan intentionally attempted to take the ball or just attempted to catch the ball? In a
similar manner, questions would arise as to the right of possession of wild animals if the court
accepted Judge Livingston's dissent in Pierson. See Paul, supra note 79, at 921-23 (discussing
why the majority opinion in Pierson provides an easier decision to administer).
249. See Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *4.
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Hayashi also could have argued that awarding the ball to Popov
creates an opportunity for fraud.2 50 Only under rare circumstances will
anyone have conclusive film evidence of a fan making the catch,2 5 1 thus
leaving the court to sift through eyewitness testimony. 25 2 Further, in
cases where video evidence exists, the court will still have a difficult
time determining whether someone reduced the ball to possession or
whether another
fan maliciously took the ball away from the first
"possessor." 25 3 Because of this difficulty, nothing will stop a fan from
declaring that he or she had possession of the ball and only lost it after
other fans stripped him of it. To prevent this type of fraud, the court
should award the ball to the individual who secures possession of the
254
ball.
This argument, however, contains one major flaw: awarding Hayashi
the ball would promote future chaos in ballparks and would harm the
second goal of Pierson.2 55 If people know that the person who holds
the ball at the end of any sequence of events has the right to possess the
ball, then the five-minute melee in Popov v. Hayashi could turn into
longer, more dangerous, and more frequent occurrences. 25 6 Even
250. See id. at *3. The decision notes that Popov's testimony proved, on the whole,
unconvincing. Id. In the Popov case, however, with the number of witnesses and the Keppel
video of the melee, it is highly unlikely that Popov attempted to fraudulently obtain the ball. The
court noted that the ball landed in Popov's glove, but it could not determine when the ball
escaped his glove. Id. at *2.
251. See Smith, supra note 2, at 77-78. Keppel stationed himself in the right field arcade
because of the proclivity of Bonds for hitting the ball to that side of the field and because of the
magnitude of the home run record. See id. at 64. Had Bonds hit a home run into the left field
bleachers, it is less likely that video evidence would exist. Id. at 77-78.
252. See Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *1. The court heard testimony from seventeen
eyewitnesses. Id. "The testimony of these witnesses varied on many important points.... Some
appeared disinterested in the outcome of the litigation and others had a clear bias. Some
remembered the events well and others did not. Some were encumbered by prior inconsistent
statements which diminished their credibility." Id.
253. See Bean, supra note 7. Although Keppel's video showed the ball landing in Popov's
glove for six-tenths of a second, it did not show what occurred in the pile-up. Id.
254. See infra Part V.A (discussing why awarding the ball to Hayashi will satisfy one of the
goals of Pierson, while awarding the ball to Popov will satisfy neither of the goals). By awarding
the ball to the person who gains absolute control over it, no individual can allege that he or she
had "possession" of the ball in the scrum or that another individual maliciously took the ball from
his or her possession. See Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *2 (concluding that the testimony and
video evidence showed no wrongful acts by Hayashi as alleged in Popov's complaint).
255. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). The court said that it
wanted to preserve "peace and order in society." Id. As Judge McCarthy indicated, "we are a
nation governed by law, not by brute force." Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *6; see also Greg
Sandoval, Judge Orders Parties to Split Bonds-Ball Cash, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2002, at DOI
(recounting the Popov case and the decision of the court), available at 2002 WL 104307229.
256. See All Things Considered,supra note 229. Paul Finkelman said that "[a]t some point,
the ball rests with someone, and we don't allow a fight to continue forever and ever and ever.
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security guards and ushers at the stadiums do not have the ability to stop
attacks and pile-ups. 257 Therefore, the court should have decided
whether to award the ball to Popov to create' a safe environment at
baseball stadiums 2 58 or to award the ball to Hayashi to create a definite
owner.

25 9

C. The Trial Court's Middle Ground
The trial court, finding that awarding the ball to one claimant over the
other would promote unfairness, elected to follow the middle ground
and award the ball to both claimants. 260 In reaching this middle ground,
the court found that both men had a right to possess the ball. 2 6'
Although this decision provides each man with an equal share in the
ball, it neither provides certainty in the event that this situation were to
happen again nor creates a safe environment at baseball games. 26 2 First,
how does one develop a pre-possessory right and at what point does this
occur? 26 3 This pre-possessory interest produces the same result as
allowing the hunter in pursuit of a wild animal to develop a property
right in the animal; it would create more questions and more
And it seems. .. that the fight stops as soon as somebody has it in his hand, which Popov did."
Id. By awarding the ball to Hayashi, the fight could continue until someone stopped it. See id.
257. See Smith, supra note 2, at 67.
258. See supra Part IV.A (discussing why awarding the ball to Popov would create a safer
environment at the ballpark).
259. See Paul, supra note 79, at 921-23 (discussing why the majority opinion in Pierson
provides an easier decision to administer). This would satisfy the first goal of Pierson. See
Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 179.
260. See Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *7.The decision stated:
An award of the ball to Mr. Popov would be unfair to Mr. Hayashi. It would be
premised on the assumption that Mr. Popov would have caught the ball. That
assumption is not supported by the facts. An award of the ball to Mr. Hayashi would
unfairly penalize Mr. Popov. It would be based on the assumption that Mr. Popov
would have dropped the ball. That conclusion is also unsupported by the facts.
Id.
261. See id. at *7-9 (discussing how each man had gained a property right in the ball, why
neither had a superior interest, and why the court could reach an equitable decision).
262. See Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 179. As stated previously, the two central goals of Pierson were
to provide a certain owner and maintain a peaceful, safe environment. Id. As precedent in the
case of a fugitive baseball, the court should attempt to reach similar goals.
263. See Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *6 (concluding that a pre-possessory right develops
when an individual attempts to obtain possession of an object but others unlawfully prevent that
individual from gaining possession of the object). This pre-possessory interest raises many
questions in certain scenarios. See Paul, supra note 79, at 921-23. For instance, does Fan A
develop a pre-possessory right to a ball if he nearly catches the ball but Fan B knocks A's glove
down before A can even touch the ball? What if A ran across two sections before B knocked A's
glove down? What if A actually touched the ball but B provided a "gentle" shove that caused A
to bobble the ball? Further, what constitutes an unlawful action? Will this definition lead to
more people claiming that they have a right to a baseball?
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litigation. 264 For this reason, it does not satisfy the first goal of
Pierson.26 5 Second, this decision does nothing to improve the safety of
fans attending a game because it still allows attacks like the one
suffered by Popov. 2 66 The definition of pre-possessory rights and what
constitutes possession does not provide fans with a clear indication of
when a fan has gained absolute possession of a baseball.2 6 7 As a result,
fans will do whatever they can to obtain absolute possession. 268 For
this reason, Judge McCarthy's decision does not satisfy the second goal
of Pierson.269 Therefore, because this decision satisfied neither goal of
Pierson, the court reached an incorrect conclusion that will not aid in
the future protection of fans at baseball games or help to define a certain
possessor of baseballs hit out of play.
V.

PROPOSAL

As the previous discussion indicated, the court's decision will likely
271
produce an adverse effect, 270 sacrificing certainty, safety, or both.
Consequently, the court should have examined the advantages and
disadvantages of each possibility, awarded the ball to the individual

264. See Paul, supra note 79, at 921-23 (discussing why the majority opinion in Pierson
provides an easier decision to administer than awarding a fox to a pursuing hunter).
265. See Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 179 (providing certainty in the decision is the first goal of
Pierson).
266. See Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *6. Although Judge McCarthy stated that he would
not allow a result creating a rule "dictated by violence," the rule does nothing to prevent violent
assaults from occurring. See id.
267. See Garofoli, supra note 15 (noting that Professor Gray, arguing on behalf of Hayashi,
asked that the court arrive at a decision that tells fans, "Once a ball is caught, then back off").
268. See supra Part II.B-C (discussing case law pertaining to the capture of wild animals and
fugitive resources). In cases involving wild animals, absolute possession occurs with the mortal
wound. See supra Part II.B (examining the classic cases concerning wild animals and who has a
right to possess them). In fugitive resource cases, absolute possession occurs when an individual
captures the fugitive resource. See supra Part I1.C (discussing the similarities between wild
animals and fugitive resources and applying the rule of capture to those fugitive resources). In
the Popov case, Hayashi gained absolute possession over the ball according, to the definition
provided by Professor Gray. See Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *4 (citing Professor Gray's
belief that possession of an object occurs when someone secures that object). As Hayashi picked
up the loose ball after the assault on Popov and still retained an interest in the ball, nothing will
stop fans in similar situations from attempting to obtain a loose ball.
269. See Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 179 (explaining the second goal for requiring the mortal wound
as a means for "preserving peace and order in society").
270. See supra Part IV.A (explaining that giving the ball to Popov results in safety but
sacrifices certainty); supra Part IV.B (discussing the concept that giving the ball to Hayashi
results in certainty but sacrifices safety); supra Part IV.C (explaining that an equitable result
provides for neither safety nor certainty).
271. See Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 179 (requiring the mortal wound to create certainty and preserve
the peace).
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who best satisfied the rule of capture, and crafted a decision that best
satisfied the goals of Pierson.27 2 To create a property right in a fugitive
object, an individual must perform an act that reduces the object to
possession, such as inflicting the mortal wound or drawing oil from
beneath the surface of each. 2 73 Because Hayashi controlled the baseball
and reduced it to possession, he developed a property right in the
ball.27 4 Further, awarding the ball to Hayashi would satisfy the goal of
certainty in Pierson,275 while awarding the ball to Popov would satisfy
neither goal. 27 6 Major League Baseball, which has the ability to dictate
who can possess the ball,2 77 can provide a rule or a practice that will
provide certainty and safety, yet acknowledge the rule of capture for
future baseballs hit out of play. 27 8 By claiming ownership of all
baseballs used during the game, Major League Baseball creates a certain
owner in all baseballs and, by eliminating milestone baseballs from the
memorabilia market, would reduce fighting in the stands because all
279
balls would be valueless.
A. The Sacrifice of Safety at Ballparks: Why the Court Should
Have Awarded the Ball to Hayashi, Thereby Granting
Possession to the Individual Who Controlled the Ball
Based on case law regarding fugitive objects, such as wild animals
and oil or natural gas, and the goals of Pierson, the court should have
awarded the ball to Hayashi.28 ° Only Hayashi could show that he
stopped the momentum of the baseball and brought it under his

272. See id.
273. See Ohio Oil v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209 (1900) (concluding that ownership occurs
only when an object is reduced to actual possession); Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 160 (D. Mass.
1881) (requiring that a whaler do everything in his power to secure a killed whale); see also supra
Part I1.B (discussing classic cases concerning wild animals and who has the right to possess
them); supra Part II.C (discussing the similarities between wild animals and fugitive resources
and applying the rule of capture to those fugitive resources).
274. See Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18,
2002). Security guards, meant to prevent the chaos that occurred, verified that Hayashi held the
Bonds ball. See Smith, supra note 2, at 68. Giants officials did the same. See id.
275. See supra Part IV.B (discussing why the court should award the ball to Hayashi).
276. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the impact of the court awarding the ball to Popov).
277. See Finkelman, supra note 82, at 1628 (explaining that baseball currently allows fans to
keep baseballs hit into the stands).
278. See infra Part V.B (providing a plan for major league baseball to retain possession of all
balls hit into the stands and still retain a fan-friendly environment).
279. See infra Part V.B (describing a proposal to Major League Baseball that would reduce
fighting in the stands and create a certain owner in every baseball used at a game).
280. See supra Part II.B-C (concluding that fugitive objects require an individual to reduce
the object to possession, thus taking away its liberty).
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control. 2 8 ' Popov could not show that he ever had possession of the
ball; he could claim only that he would have maintained control of the
ball but for the actions of an out-of-control mob. 2 82 A decision
awarding the ball to Popov would raise many questions concerning
when possession begins, just as awarding possession to a hunter in
pursuit of a wild animal would create the same questions. 283 At the
same time, although arguments for either side in this case are flawed,
awarding the ball to Hayashi appears harsh. 2 84 Nonetheless, awarding
the ball to Hayashi would satisfy at least one of the goals of Pierson,the
goal of certainty.2 8 5
The court should have better considered the goals of Pierson.286 In
awarding the ball to Hayashi, the court would satisfy the goal of
certainty; in awarding the ball to Popov, the court would appear to
satisfy the goal of safety. 287 On the other hand, because a court cannot
alter human nature with its decision and a decision awarding the ball to
Popov would likely have no effect on fan behavior, awarding the ball to
him would satisfy neither of the goals of Pierson.288 Even if the court

281. See Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18,
2002). The court adopted the definition of possession of a baseball authored by Professor Gray,
which Hayashi achieved. Id. at *5; see also infra note 291 (quoting Professor Gray's definition
of possession). This definition of possession is much like the mortal wound of a wild animal.
See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). Giants officials and security guards
verified that Hayashi held the Bonds ball. See Smith, supra note 2, at 68. Major League Baseball
representatives, while taking no stand as to whom has a right to possess the ball, stated that
Hayashi had the ball when they arrived to verify it. See Dolan, supra note 22.
282. See Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *6-7 (discussing why Popov could not maintain
control of the ball but still had achieved a legally recognizable pre-possessory right to the ball).
283. See Paul, supra note 79, at 921-23 (discussing why the majority opinion in Pierson
provides an easier decision to administer).
284. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the strongest arguments for Popov to retain possession
of the Bonds ball); supra Part IV.B (discussing the strongest arguments for Hayashi to retain
possession of the Bonds ball).
285. See infra notes 288-91 and accompanying text (explaining the reasons why awarding the
ball to Hayashi would satisfy the goal of certainty in Pierson, while awarding the ball to Popov
would satisfy neither the safety nor the certainty goal).
286. See Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 179 (requiring a mortal wound in order to promote certainty and
preserve order in society).
287. See supra Part IV.A (discussing Popov's arguments that he would have maintained
possession but for the violence of the crowd and why awarding him the ball would produce safer
ballparks); supra Part IV.B (discussing Hayashi's arguments that he clearly had possession of the
ball and that awarding him the ball would create certainty and eliminate the possibility of fraud).
288. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 69-73 (Everyman 1973) (1651) (discussing the
human nature of partaking in war with every other person, leading to a short, nasty, and brutish
life). In the Popov case, stating that a fan "should have ... the opportunity to try to complete his
catch unimpeded by unlawful activity" will not cause fans to sit back and allow someone else to
catch a ball hit out of play. Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731, at *6 (Cal.
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awarded the ball to Popov, most fans would still believe that, while the
ball was in the air, it belonged to them and would therefore do anything
in their power to possess that ball.28 9
Therefore, future courts should award a fugitive baseball to the fan
who retains possession of the ball at the end of the play because the fan
who first touches the ball cannot establish that he or she would have
gained control of the ball. Awarding the ball to the fan who first
touches it would not promote certainty or create a safer environment at
a ballpark. 290 To that end, future courts should adopt Professor Gray's
definition of possession of a baseball. 2 9 1 Because representatives for
Major League Baseball have declared that they will not institute new
rules that would take away fans' right to keep a baseball hit out of play,
future courts need to act in order to craft a rule that would define
possession, create certainty, and provide for a safer environment at
ballparks. 292 A ruling in favor the fan who first touches a fugitive
baseball likely would have little effect on fan behavior at ballparks and
likely would lead to numerous questions regarding what constitutes
possession, and, therefore, only by awarding the ball to the fan who

Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002). Each fan believes the ball, while in the air, belongs to him or her. See
Smith, supra note 2, at 66.
289. See Smith, supra note 2, at 66. Because each fan will try to catch a ball, does it become
an unlawful activity for someone to push another fan to get a better position or to jump up to
catch the ball and land on another fan, creating a pre-possessory right? This rule creates too
many questions, much like the dissenting opinion in Pierson. See Paul, supra note 79, at 921-23
(discussing why the majority opinion in Pierson provides an easier decision to administer than
awarding a fox to a pursuing hunter).
290. See Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *4-6. "Mr. Popov has not established by a
preponderance of the evidence that he would have retained control of the ball after all momentum
ceased and after any incidental contact with people or objects." Id. at *6. Hayashi established
possession of the ball, but the court would not award him the ball because of Popov's prepossessory interest in it and because awarding him the ball would condone violence. See id. at
*6-7.
291. Id. at *4. Professor Gray provides the following definition of possession as it relates to a
baseball hit into the stands at a ballpark:
A person who catches a baseball that enters the stand is its owner. A ball is caught if
the person has achieved complete control of the ball at the point in time that the
momentum of the ball and the momentum of the fan while attempting to catch the ball
ceases. A baseball, which is dislodged by incidental contact with an inanimate object
or another person, before momentum has ceased, is not possessed. Incidental contact
with another person is contact that is not intended by the other person. The first person
to pick up a loose ball and secure it becomes its possessor.
Id.
292. See Garofoli, supra note 7; see also Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1805) (requiing the act of the mortal wound, instead of pursuit only, to create a property right in
an effort to provide certainty and a peaceful society).
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retains possession at the end of the play can the court satisfy at least one
29 3
of the goals of Pierson.
B. A Proposalto Major League Baseball
Although no written rule of Major League Baseball states that fans
may retain baseballs hit into the stands, baseball customs provide that
fans may keep what they catch.2 9 4 Several teams and stadiums provide
written rules or act in a manner that grants fans the right to keep balls
hit into the stands. 295 Allowing fans to keep baseballs creates a fanfriendly environment for those who attend games. 296 After the events
that occurred at Pac Bell, however, Major League Baseball could
potentially face lawsuits if similar events occur again. 297 Because of
these potential lawsuits, Major League Baseball should develop a plan
that maintains its fan-friendly image, protects its fans at the ballparks,
29 8
and provides a definite owner of all baseballs.
Major League Baseball should develop a league-wide rule that
declares that all baseballs used during an official game belong to Major
League Baseball. 299 Such a rule would create certainty as to whom has
293. See supra notes 280-85 and accompanying text (discussing why awarding the ball to
Popov would not lead to safety or surety and why awarding the ball to Hayashi creates a
definition that provides a definite possessor).
294. See Finkelman, supra note 82, at 1621. "For at least the last eighty years, almost all fans
attending professional baseball games in the United States have assumed they have a right to take
home any balls they catch or retrieve in the stands." Id.
295. Id. at 1621-22 (noting that Comerica Park in Detroit contains posted signs saying fans
can keep balls hit out of play and that the web site for the Seattle Mariners encourages fans to
keep balls hit out of play). "[TIhe Giants ... like all major league franchises, . . . traditionally
allow[] fans to keep balls that land in the stands .... " Dolan, supra note 22.
296. See Finkelman, supra note 82, at 1622. Further, Finkelman notes that John McEnroe and
other tennis pros "have been arguing that U.S. Open officials should make the game more fanfriendly by allowing those who catch balls to keep them." Id.
297. See G.M. KELLY, SPORT AND THE LAW 219-26 (1987) (describing the liability of the
organizer of a sporting event in cases of injury to spectators because of a failure to protect them).
298. With the high cost to attend games, high player salaries, and the reduced attendance at
games, Major League Baseball needs to do something to improve its image, especially after the
recent events at Pac Bell. It costs fans an average of $145.28 to attend a baseball game at a major
league stadium. See The Guide to Major League Baseball Stadium Expenses (2002), at
http:/home.digitalcity.comballparkfigures (last visited May 7, 2003). This cost is based on "the
cost of two average child-price tickets and two average adult-priced tickets, four small soft
drinks, two small beers, four hot dogs, parking for one car, two game programs and two souvenir
caps." See id. The highest paid player in baseball, Alex Rodriguez, makes an average of
$156,000 per game. See Greg Cote, Fans Left Adrift in Widening Gulf Between Them, Athletes,
MIAMI HERALD, July 17, 2002, at Sports, available at 2002 WL 24339488. The high cost to
attend games and the salaries of players has led to a reduction of fan attendance and a growing
separation between fans and players. See id.
299. See Budish, supra note 180. This would be similar to the way that the state "owns" and
regulates the takings of wild animals. See 4 AM. JUR. 2D Animals § 14 (1995). Teams in Japan
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a right to possess any ball hit or thrown out of play and would also
create safer ballparks. 30 0 By declaring Major League Baseball the
owner of all baseballs, the rule would eliminate the question of what an
individual has to do to create a property right in a ball. 30 ' Further,
because an individual fan could not own a ball, the balls would have no
secondary market value. 30 2 Therefore, such a league-wide rule would
reduce the chance that fans would fight over a ball. Finally, the rule
would ensure that every major baseball milestone resides with Major
30 3
League Baseball and its Hall of Fame.
Major League Baseball, however, should not take away the fans'
right to catch and to keep balls hit out of play without giving the fans

something in return. 30 4 If Major League Baseball took away the
opportunity to keep balls without giving fans anything in return, it
would harm its fan-friendly image. 30 5 In return for fans giving up any
ball that they catch, ushers at the stadiums could present fans with a
voucher. 30 6 Such a voucher would allow fans who catch balls hit out of

play to redeem them for two tickets to a future game 30 7 or an

required fans who caught foul balls to return them to ushers; in return those fans received a small
gift. See Finkelman, supra note 82, at 1621 n.48. Armond Budish suggests that Major League
Baseball make a rule that requires fans to return baseballs of significant importance, such as
Bonds's seventy-third or Hank Aaron's 755th, to place them in the Hall of Fame. See Budish.,
supra note 180. Budish, however, acknowledges the difficulty in seeking the return of only
significant baseballs, recognizing that "[m]aybe no official wants to be the one to have to
approach a young child who caught a home-run ball to demand its return." See id.
300. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (requiring a mortal wound in
order to promote certainty and preserve order in society).
301. See Budish, supra note 180. This rule would create a situation of a lost and found item,
with the fan acting as both the finder and bailee of the baseball. In such a situation, "[al finder of
property acquires no rights in mislaid property, and is entitled to possession of lost property
against everyone except the true owner." Michael v. First Chi. Corp., 487 N.E.2d 403, 409 (II1.
App. Ct. 1985). Major League Baseball would be the true owner of the ball and fans would have
to return all balls to it.
302. See Matt Bean, Fans Take the Stand to Describe Melee Over Record-Setting Ball.
CourtTV.com (Oct. 18, 2002), at http://www.courttv.com/trials/baseball/101802_ctv.html (last
visited May 7, 2003) (noting that fans who held season tickets had never seen an attack at the
ballpark, insinuating that the unusual value of the ball caused fans to act in this manner); see also
Bean, supra note 7 (detailing that fans admitted to "groping and grappling ... for the ultimate
prize").
303. See Budish, supra note 180.
304. See Finkelman, supra note 82, at 1621 n.48. This solution would be similar to the way in
which Japanese teams collected balls hit into the stands. See id. A fan in Japan who caught a ball
hit out of play received a gift in return. Id.
305. See id. at 1621-24 (discussing how Major League Baseball allows fans to keep part of
the game by catching balls hit out of play, unlike other sports that require fans to return balls).
306. See id. at 1621 n.48.
307. This would allow a fan to attend the game of his or her choice.

942

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 34

opportunity to meet the players after the game. 30 8 Providing fans with
two tickets to a future game would defray some of the costs of attending
games, while allowing fans to meet the players after the game would
provide fans with. the chance to meet their heroes and create a
connection between fans and players. 30 9 These options should improve
the image of baseball and lead to an increase in fan attendance.
Major League Baseball would also need to declare that it would
never attempt to sell any of the collected baseballs for a profit in order
to eliminate the secondary market for historic baseballs. The teams
could use the retrieved balls in one of three ways: (1) they could return
the ball for game use, provided the ball was not scuffed or damaged in
any way; (2) they could provide the baseballs to youth baseball
programs, like Little League Baseball; 3 10 or (3) they could enshrine
significant balls in the Baseball Hall of Fame for the enjoyment of the
fans. Rules such as these would provide a certain owner for all
baseballs, a safer environment at all stadiums, and improve the image of
Major League Baseball. Although this plan would protect fans and
baseball, Major League Baseball has no current plans to institute rules
3 11
like these.
VI. CONCLUSION

In cases such as Popov v. Hayashi, no court decision will provide for
a certain possessor and also create a safe environment; it can
accomplish only one or the other. The actions and behavior of fans at
any sporting event, however, will not change based on a decision from
the courts. 3 12 Awarding the ball to Popov will not cause fans to move
308. This would allow a fan to attend the post game buffet with all of the players from both
teams, including the stars of the team, like Bonds with the Giants or Sosa with the Cubs.
309. See supra note 298 (noting the creation of a separation between fans and players due to
the inflation of players' salaries and the rising cost of attending games).
310. As all historical, and therefore expensive, baseballs would be housed in the Hall of Fame,
the secondary market effectively would be eliminated. Balls given to the Little League would be
foul balls and insignificant home runs; those balls would be relatively worthless.
311. See Garofoli, supra note 7. Major League Baseball has declared that it does not have any
current plans to "confiscat[e] potentially significant home run balls as a way to remove the
incentive for fans to pile on each other." Id.
312. See Dave George, Fanatics or Lunatics?, PALM BEACH POST, Dec. 25, 2002, at Cl
(detailing the history of fan behavior at sporting events from a 1924 brawl by fans at a TigersYankees baseball game, to a 1968 Eagles football game where fans threw snowballs at Santa
Claus, to the "10-cent Beer Night" brawl between fans of the Cleveland Indians and players on
the Texas Rangers, to the recent father and son who attacked a Kansas City Royals coach at a
Chicago White Sox game), available at 2002 WL 105028129. An umpire who had been struck in
the head with a chair during the "10-cent Beer Night" brawl in Cleveland described the fans as
"uncontrollable beasts." Id. He went on to say "I've never seen anything like it, except in a zoo."
Id. This statement, however, transcends that single event.
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over and let someone else catch a ball hit out of play; the fans will still
push and shove in an effort to catch the ball. Instead, the court should
have followed and applied the law of possession for cases of wild
animals and fugitive resources to the baseball. This requires that an
individual perform an act, such as striking the mortal wound or drawing
oil into a well, to reduce an object to possession and gain a property
right in that object. In the controversy between Popov and Hayashi,
only Hayashi reduced the ball to possession by stopping its momentum
and holding on to the ball. The court should have adopted the definition
of possession of a baseball provided by Professor Brian Gray and
allowed Major League Baseball to create a solution to protect its fans
and the league.

